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2006 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 10-12, 2006  
 
Mark your calendar! The British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs 
of Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General 
and the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia will be hosting the "Police 
Leadership 2006 Conference" April 10 to 12, 
2006 at the Westin Bayshore in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest Police 
Leadership Conference and was sold out in 2004.  
 
This conference will emphasize leadership as an 
activity, not a position, and provide an 
opportunity for participants of all ranks from 
police agencies across Canada, the United 
States, and beyond to engage with a carefully 
chosen list of first class speakers, some of the 
world's outstanding authorities on leadership.  
 
For more updates on this conference as they 
develop, please bookmark: 
 
www.jibc.bc.ca/police/main/ 
promoforleadership2006.htm 
  
‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ NOW IN 
5th YEAR 
The Police Academy’s newsletter has now 
entered its fifth year of publication. Back issues 
are now available from 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and now 2005 by navigating the Police Academy 
website at www.jibc.bc.ca.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARCH 12-15, 2005 
 
“Mass Murder in the Home, 
the School and the Workplace: 
Spree Killers and Annihilators” 
 
Location: 
 
Ramada Inn & Conference Centre 
Abbotsford, BC 
 
Registration: 
 
 
$329 regular—Registration fee includes 
tickets to the opening ceremonies and 
receptions, on-site continental 
breakfasts, and tickets for the conference banquet. 
 
Topics: 
 
 Dunblane School Massacre, 
Scotland, 1996 
 Gakhal Family Murders, Vernon, 
British Columbia, 1996 
 Ottawa Transpo Massacre, Ottawa, 
Ontario, 2001 
 Kamloops Murders, British Columbia, 
2002 
 Port Arthur Massacre, Tasmania, 
1996 
 Columbine High School Massacre, 
1999 
 
Expert presenters include Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, U.S. 
Army (Retired), Director, Killology Research Group, is 
one of the world's foremost experts in the field of human 
aggression, the roots of violence and violent crime. 
 
Visit www.fvlec.org for more info! 
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‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
The “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter would like to 
share some of our 
readers’ comments about 
the publication. We 
appreciate the kind 
words we have received and continue to look 
forward to serving Canada’s police officers: 
************ 
“Thanks…for the newsletter, always a very good 
read & crucial information”—Police Sergeant, 
British Columbia 
************ 
“I have been receiving the In-service 10-8 
Newsletter for some time now and it is greatly 
appreciated.  Even though we are provinces 
apart, it is amazing how we can be dealing 
with very similar issues day in and day out.  I am 
into my 5th year as an Instructor…and the 
information provided in your newsletter always 
comes in handy as we like to refer to incidents / 
case law to substantiate the topics that we 
present during in-service training. Keep up the 
excellent work!”—Police Officer, Ontario 
************ 
“I just wanted to say that I think you do an 
excellent job of encapsulating relevant case[s] 
using minimal time and space while losing nothing 
in content. I wish I had known about this 
publication when I was practising criminal 
defence law…”—Reviewer/Analyst, Commission 
for Public Complaints Against the RCMP 
************ 
“While researching the internet for photos of 
prohibited weapons for a course I am putting 
together, I came across your In Service: 10-8 
newsletter dealing with prohibited weapons and 
am emailing to see if I can get permission to use 
your newsletter in an upcoming course I am 
running for our dispatchers and records 
personal.”—Police Training Officer, Ontario 
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“Just a quick note to request that I be added to 
the distribution list for your newsletter at this 
address. I wish we had something similar in 
Ontario..IT's a great read. Thanks”—Police 
Officer, Ontario 
************ 
“I would love to receive the newsletter on a 
regular basis.”—Police Constable, British 
Columbia 
************ 
“Great work on the case law articles. Could you 
please subscribe me to your 10-8 newsletter? 
(SIGH) ....the Mounties don't have a letter like 
this.”—Police Constable, RCMP British Columbia  
 ************ 
“I really enjoy reading your articles, they have 
helped me on the job immensely!”—Police 
Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
“Just read the latest 10-8 and wanted to once 
again express my appreciation for this 
"epistle"...the cases and referrals to statistics 
are invaluable so thanks for that... Take Care and 
keep up the good work.”—Criminology College 
Instructor, British Columbia  
************ 
“I am a member of the Canadian Forces Military 
Police… I am writing to request that I be added 
to your electronic distribution list for the 10-8 
newsletter.  This continues to be an outstanding 
publication, keep up the good work!”—Military 
Police Corporal, British Columbia 
 
ROADSIDE DEMAND REQUIRES 
NOTHING MORE THAN A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
R. v. Dunfield, 2004 BCPC 0419 
 
After stopping the accused for 
excessive speeding at 01:42 am, 
an officer asked her if she had 
been drinking. She said she had 
beer and wine at 9:30 pm and 
had been involved in a fight with her husband. An 
odour of liquor emanated from the vehicle and 
the accused was crying, had a pale face with 
flushed cheeks, running mascara and bloodshot, 
watery eyes. The accused was asked to exit the 
vehicle and was somewhat unsteady on her feet 
while she stood on level ground. The officer 
formed a suspicion the accused had alcohol in 
her body and proceeded with a roadside 
screening demand.  
 
During her trial in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused argued that the smell of 
liquor from the vehicle and the other 
observations were not sufficient to justify the 
roadside screening demand. In her view, 
something more was required, such as asking 
when her first and last drink occurred.  
 
In rejecting the accused’s submission, Justice 
Moss concluded the officer proceeded properly. 
He stated: 
 
The essential question is whether or not [the 
officer] had, objectively speaking, reasonable 
grounds for her suspicion. Looking at it in its 
entirety, the evidence involves the admission 
by the driver of the consumption of liquor at 
an earlier time. The officer had in her mind 
the concern she may not be getting the truth, 
which I do not find to be shocking. Thus there 
is the admission of the consumption of liquor 
at some time prior to the time of driving. The 
officer also had the driver with watery, 
bloodshot eyes, saying she had recently had an 
argument and had been drinking at an earlier 
time around 9:30 p.m., and finally, there was 
the smell of liquor emanating from the driver's 
side when the window was down. 
 
[The officer] concluded there were reasonable 
grounds to pursue the matter and therefore, 
in order to satisfy herself, she made an 
approved roadside screening device demand. A 
roadside screening device is one more tool in a 
police officer's toolbox with regard to the 
investigation of suspected impaired drivers, 
and is often used to raise "mere suspicion" to 
reasonable and probable grounds if there is a 
fail reading obtained. 
 
I am satisfied [the officer] had the required 
subjective belief at the time she made the 
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breath demand. On an objective analysis, I 
cannot say that I would be prepared to 
conclude there was not a constellation of 
objective factors surrounding the situation 
that would make it unreasonable for her to 
have made the demand. [para. 9-11] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
NO PRIVACY INTEREST 
THROUGH OPEN DOOR 
R. v. Motevaselan, 2004 BCPC 0453 
 
The police received a report 
that a hotel staff worker had 
been assaulted hours earlier. 
The suspect was last seen 
entering a rooming house next door to the hotel. 
The police were shown a photograph of the 
suspect and told he was seen enter the rooming 
house about one and a half hours earlier. 
Officers entered the second floor hallway of the 
rooming house through a locked door by using a 
key given to them in the past by the landlord. 
Along the hallway were several individually 
numbered doors, which gave entry into each 
tenant’s sleeping room. The tenants shared a 
communal washroom and a communal kitchen.  
 
As the police approached the suspect—seen at 
the far end of the hallway—they passed by a 
room and saw a woman standing in the open 
doorway talking to people inside. Looking over 
her shoulder into the room, an officer saw the 
accused, and a female, seated on a bed mattress 
with a small quantity of what appeared to be 
crack cocaine, a set of scales, a crack pipe, and 
cash. The officer stepped into the room, 
arrested the accused for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, handcuffed him, and took 
him from the room. He was searched for safety 
(weapons, needles) and police found more cocaine 
in the front of his pants along with $85 in his 
pocket.  
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
on charges of possession of cocaine and heroin 
for the purpose of trafficking, the accused 
argued the police unlawfully entered the second 
floor of the rooming house when they opened the 
locked door without a warrant, hot pursuit or 
exigent circumstances. He submitted he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his own 
room as well as the hallway, which he uses to 
access the communal washroom and kitchen. In 
his view, his s.8 Charter rights securing him 
against unreasonable search or seizure were 
violated and the evidence should be excluded. 
 
Justice Weitzel disagreed. In his opinion there 
was no Charter breach. The accused did not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
hallway or in his room with the door open. Since 
the drugs were in plain view, the officer had the 
right to enter the room and seize the drugs 
before they could be destroyed. The detention 
that followed was also lawful , including the pat-
own search that lead to the discovery of more 
drugs. Justice Weitzel wrote: 
 
[I]t is my view that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this common hallway 
in the circumstances of this case. Other 
tenants of the rooming house, their visitors, 
repair people, the landlord, and so on, could be 
reasonably expected to be in the hallway quite 
independent of the consent or invitation of the 
accused, and any of them could easily have 
looked through the open door into the 
accused's room. In my view, if the accused had 
an expectation of privacy in the common room, 
it was lesser than the expectation in his room 
proper, and any expectation, in my view, of 
privacy was waived by sitting in the room with 
the door open. 
 
The police were in the hallway for a proper 
unrelated investigative purpose with the 
consent, express or implied, of the landlord, 
who had given them a key at some point in the 
past. The landlord was clearly a person who 
had the right to use the hallway and to 
regulate other non-residents from doing so as 
well. Accordingly, I find that the presence of 
the police in the hallway did not amount to in 
essence an unlawful attendance, and their view 
into the room was not, in my view, an 
unreasonable search. 
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The door to the accused's room, as I say, was 
open, or partially open, and afforded anyone in 
the hallway the opportunity to look inside. The 
room was small, approximately eight feet by 
eight feet, and I am satisfied on the evidence 
that the accused himself knew that the door 
was open. The drugs were in plain view, along 
with the other items. In those circumstances, 
in my view, provisions of the Criminal Code and 
the Controlled Drug and Substances Act 
authorized [the officer] to enter without 
warrant, to seize the cocaine, and prevent it 
from being destroyed. In my view, his 
detention of the accused was also lawful, as 
was the attendant pat-down search of him 
aimed at finding any weapons or sharp objects 
which may affect officer safety. [references 
omitted, paras. 20-22] 
 
The evidence resulting from the seizure in the 
room and the search of the accused was 
admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
SEARCH WARRANT ONLY 
REQUIRES CREDIBLY BASED 
PROBABILITY  
R. v. Schneider, 2004 NSCA 99 
 
Police obtained a search 
warrant to search the accused’s 
home. The complainant and his 
family were neighbours of the 
accused and alleged they were 
harassed over a six month period in several ways, 
including spitting, shaking fists, running at their 
car, throwing rocks at their house, shining a 
flashlight into the windows at night, verbal 
harassment, blocking entry, cutting branches, 
banging pipes, scattering glass on their property, 
cutting pieces of their porch and photographing 
them against their will. Some of these incidents 
were supported by video tape recordings made 
by the complainant.  
The accused were convicted in Nova Scotia 
Provincial Court of criminal harassment and 
mischief under the Criminal Code and a 
conviction appeal was dismissed by the Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court. The accused launched a 
further appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the search of their 
home was unlawful because there was no 
evidence upon which to justify the warrant. In 
their submission there were no reasonable 
grounds they committed the offences they were 
charged with because the complainant was lying. 
Justice Cromwell, authoring the court’s 
judgment, concluded the police did have 
reasonable grounds for believing the accused had 
committed offences and that the search of their 
home would provide evidence of these offences. 
The information to obtain the warrant contained 
detailed information from a journal kept by the 
complainant and some incidents were captured on 
videotape. In examining the sufficiency of the 
information to obtain in this case, the court 
noted: 
A justice of the peace who issues a search 
warrant must be satisfied by information on 
oath that there are reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that an offence has been 
committed and that evidence of it is to be 
found in the place of search… The standard is 
one of credibly based probability… The 
affiant's reasonable belief does not have to be 
based on personal knowledge, but the 
Information to obtain the warrant must, in the 
totality of circumstances, disclose a 
substantial basis for the existence of the 
affiant's belief… On review of the issuance of 
a search warrant, as in this case by the trial 
judge, the question is whether the record 
before the justice of the peace who issued the 
warrant, as properly amplified on review, 
provides a proper basis upon which the search 
warrant could be issued...[para. 75] 
And further: 
 
A police officer investigating an alleged crime 
and a justice of the peace asked to issue a 
search warrant are not trial judges deciding 
guilt or innocence. The police officer may 
proceed on the basis of belief that reasonable 
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LEGAL LANGUAGE 
Certiorari—a writ issued from a
superior court inquiring into the
validity of proceedings in an
inferior court and commonly used
for the purpose of quashing
orders. 
and probable grounds exist which have a 
credible basis and the justice of the peace 
may issue a search warrant if satisfied that 
this is so. [The officer in this case] was 
examined at length at trial and, at the end of 
it all, it could not have been clearer that he 
believed the [accused] had committed 
offences. It was also clear that he thought 
that [the complainant’s] detailed records and 
video tape provided a reasonable and credible 
basis for that belief. The justice of the peace 
was evidently satisfied that the requirements 
had been met as were the trial judge and the 
[summary conviction appeal court]. [para. 78] 
 
On its face, the material before the issuing 
justice of the peace provided a proper basis for 
authorizing the warrant. The warrant was valid 
and the search was therefore authorized by law. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
HEARSAY OK FOR SEARCH 
WARRANT GROUNDS 
R. v. Agensys International Inc. et al, 
(2004) Docket: C38981 & M30925 
(OntCA) 
 
Revenue Canada investigated the 
accused for offences under the 
Income Tax Act and the Criminal 
Code. A special Investigations 
Unit officer swore an information 
to obtain a warrant, which included hearsay 
information from several sources. As a result, a 
search warrant was granted to search business 
and residential premises. Six months after the 
warrant was executed, the accused filed an 
application seeking an 
order of certiorari 
quashing the warrants 
and declaring their 
Charter rights under 
s.8 had been violated.  
 
The application was dismissed and the accused 
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, 
in part, that the investigator improperly relied 
on multiple layers of hearsay evidence without 
making inquiries to verify the accuracy of it. 
This, in the accused’s view, caused a fatal flaw in 
the warrant because the information did not 
offer full, frank and fair disclosure.  
 
Justice Gillese, on behalf of the court, dismissed 
the appeal. As long as the information relied 
upon is properly sourced, hearsay can support 
the issuance of a search warrant. She stated: 
 
[A]lthough the deponent of an Information to 
Obtain should consider obtaining information 
directly from those with first-hand knowledge 
of the facts, it is not a legal requirement that 
the deponent do so. Like search warrant 
applicants, such deponents are entitled to rely 
upon hearsay. Again like search warrant 
applicants, where hearsay is relied upon, it 
must be presented in a way that allows the 
issuing judge to make his or her own 
determination about the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the sources of information. 
The Information to Obtain should never 
attempt to trick its readers. It should set out 
the facts truthfully, fully and 
plainly…[references omitted, para. 43]   
 
But “it is important that an affiant properly 
source all the information relied upon,”, which in 
some cases may require providing sufficient 
information on an expert’s credentials so the 
justice can satisfy themselves the expert is 
qualified to give their opinion. Furthermore, 
information provided to the investigator by 
other Revenue Canada employees does not 
require independent verification of its accuracy, 
unlike a tip from unproven or unknown sources 
that require confirmation.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
If you lead through fear you will have little to 
respect; but if you lead through respect, you will 
have little to fear—Unknown  
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CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS 
CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING 
EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY 
R. v. Suttie,  
(2004) Docket:C40183 (OntCA) 
 
After stopping the accused for a 
seatbelt violation, a police 
officer formed a reasonable 
suspicion he had alcohol in his 
body and administered a roadside screening test. 
The accused failed and subsequently provided 
breath samples of 212mg% and 218mg%. He was 
charged with care and control with a blood 
alcohol content over 80mg% and the certificate 
of qualified technician was tendered as evidence, 
but the technician was not called to testify.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused testified to the amount of alcohol he 
consumed, which according to an expert 
toxicologist would have provided a blood alcohol 
level well below 80mg%. The trial judge 
considered the contents of analysis—absent the 
presumption of accuracy under s.258(1)(g) of the 
Criminal Code—when determining whether the 
accused had raised a reasonable doubt about his 
blood alcohol level as stated in the certificate of 
analysis. He rejected the evidence to the 
contrary and convicted the accused.  
 
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was successful.  The appeal 
judge found the trial judge had erred in 
considering the breathalyzer readings in 
assessing the accused’s evidence to the contrary. 
He set aside the conviction and ordered a new 
trial. The Crown then appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal.  
 
Proving an Over 80mg% Charge 
 
If the Crown seeks to prove an over 80mg% 
charge by relying on the certificate of qualified 
technician it must show that the results 
reported in the certificate accurately reflects 
the results of the breathalyzer and also that the 
driver’s blood alcohol level at the time of driving 
was over 80mg%. In overcoming these two 
evidentiary hurdles, the Crown may rely on two 
statutory presumptions—the presumption of 
accuracy and the presumption of identity. Since 
each presumption is different, they will require 
different “evidence to the contrary” to raise a 
reasonable doubt about the fact to be presumed. 
 
Presumption of Accuracy 
 
Section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code allows the 
Crown to introduce the certificate of analysis as 
proof of blood alcohol level without calling the 
breathalyzer technician taking the samples. 
Justice Goudge described the presumption in 
this way: 
 
The presumption of accuracy permits the 
Crown to prove the accused's blood alcohol 
level at the time the breathalyzer test was 
administered without calling a qualified 
breathalyzer technician. According to this 
presumption, the lowest result of the analyzed 
samples reported in the certificate provided 
by the qualified breathalyzer technician is 
presumed to accurately reflect the blood 
alcohol level of the accused at the time the 
test was administered, absent evidence to the 
contrary. This presumption is the product of s. 
258(1)(g) of the Code which makes the 
certificate admissible and s. 25(1) of the 
Interpretation Act which makes the 
certificate presumptive proof of those facts 
absent evidence to the contrary… 
 
The consequence of these sections is twofold. 
First, the certificate is admissible as evidence 
of the facts stated in it without the need to 
call a qualified breathalyser technician. This 
serves as a statutory exception to the hearsay 
rule. In effect, it makes the written 
statement of the qualified breathalyser 
technician admissible as some evidence of the 
truth of the assertions in the certificate. 
These include that two breath samples that 
were taken at the specified time and place; 
that the samples were analyzed by an approved 
instrument as defined in s. 254(1) of the Code; 
that the technician had ascertained the 
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instrument to be in proper working order; and 
what the results were of the two analyses. 
 
The second consequence is that these facts 
are deemed to be established or conclusively 
proven in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary. [paras. 16-18] 
 
In short, s.258(1)(g) “declares that the 
breathalyser certificate is evidence of the facts 
alleged in it…[including] the blood alcohol 
readings of the accused recorded by the 
breathalyser.” However, the presumption of 
accuracy can be displaced if a reasonable doubt 
is raised about whether the driver’s blood 
alcohol content was actually under 80mg% had 
the breathalyzer test produced accurate 
results. Simply offering evidence that the blood 
alcohol level at the time of testing was different 
from that recorded by the breathalyzer is not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption.  
 
Presumption of Identity 
 
The presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of 
the Criminal Code, on the other hand, allows the 
Crown to prove blood alcohol level at the time of 
driving without having to call an expert by using 
the lowest reading on the breathalyzer provided 
it was taken within two hours of the time of 
driving. Justice Goudge stated: 
 
Under this provision, it is presumed, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, that the 
lowest of the blood alcohol readings referred 
to in the certificate provided by the 
breathalyzer operator is identical to the 
accused's blood alcohol level at the time of 
the offence. This presumption avoids the need 
for the Crown to call expert evidence in every 
case as to the accused's blood alcohol level 
when he or she was driving based on an 
extrapolation from the results of the 
breathalyzer test administered up to two 
hours after the driving occurred. [para. 19] 
 
The presumption of identity can be rebutted “if 
there is evidence accepted by the court that 
tends to show that the blood alcohol level of the 
accused was different at the time of the 
breathalyzer test than at the time of the 
driving.” It is not necessary to show the blood 
alcohol level at the time of driving was below 
80mg%, but only that it was different. An 
example that may displace this presumption is 
evidence of consumption after driving but 
before testing. If the presumption of identity is 
successfully rebutted, Crown will have to call 
other evidence relating the breathalyzer reading 
back to the time of driving.   
 
Assessing “Evidence to the Contrary”  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the 
certificate of analysis could be used by a judge 
in assessing whether to accept or reject the 
accused’s “evidence to the contrary”, absent the 
statutory presumption: 
 
To treat the certificate as some evidence of 
the facts contained in it is not to give it the 
presumptive effect of establishing those 
facts. The certificate is merely some hearsay 
evidence that a qualified breathalyser 
technician conducted two tests of the accused 
with an approved device which produced the 
blood alcohol results set out in the certificate. 
The court simply considers this together with 
the other evidence before it in deciding 
whether to accept or reject the tendered 
evidence to the contrary. 
 
It is true that in doing so the court can treat 
the certificate as no more than some evidence 
of the facts set out in it. The court cannot 
treat the certificate as establishing or 
conclusively proving those facts, since to do so 
would be to prematurely apply the presumption 
in s. 25 of the Interpretation Act before the 
court has determined whether there is 
evidence to the contrary rebutting the 
presumption. However even without the 
presumption, the readings contained in the 
certificate are deemed by s. 258(1)(g) to 
constitute some evidence of the accused's 
blood alcohol level at the time of testing. 
 
There is no doubt that weighing the hearsay 
evidence contained in the certificate of 
analysis against the viva voce evidence of the 
defence tending to show a blood alcohol level 
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below .08 at the time of testing presents a 
challenge because the evidence in the 
certificate comes to the court in documentary 
form which must be weighed against live 
evidence. Although it is not necessary that 
they do so, it would not be surprising if triers 
of fact proceeded as the trial judge did here 
by focussing first on a careful examination of 
the viva voce defence evidence and its 
inherent strengths and weaknesses in the 
context of the balance of the evidence apart 
from the certificate, and only then turning to 
consider the contents of the certificate, in 
reaching a conclusion about whether to accept 
or reject the tendered evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
Moreover, in my view, it will be the rarest case 
in which the certificate alone is a sufficient 
basis to reject otherwise credible defence 
evidence in the contrary. If there is nothing in 
either the balance of the evidence or the 
defence evidence itself to undermine the 
latter in any way, to reject it only because of 
the contents of the certificate risks the court 
wrongly according premature presumptive 
effect to the certificate, either in its own 
reasoning process or in the result. Neither 
accords with Parliament's intent in s. 258(1)(g) 
of the Code and s. 25 of the Interpretation 
Act, that in the context of conflicting 
evidence, the certificate should not constitute 
conclusive proof of its contents. [para. 30-33] 
 
In this case, once the evidence to the contrary 
was rejected, the certificate’s statutory 
presumptions were used to establish the 
accused’s blood alcohol level at the time of 
testing under s.258(1)(g) and at the time of 
driving under s.258(1)(c). 
 
The appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction was restored.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
A leader leads by example, whether he intends 
to or not—Unknown  
 
NEAR PASSIVE ‘TRICK’ NOT 
ELICITATION 
R. v. Mishra, 2004 BCCA 598 
 
While executing a search 
warrant arising from a lengthy 
drug investigation at the 
accused’s automobile detailing 
business police found money, 
scales, bullets, cocaine, heroin, score cards, 
other drug paraphernalia, and a picture of the 
accused and his family inside a locked filing 
cabinet with a bag containing $35,830 in cash—
the going price for a kilo of cocaine—on top of 
the cabinet. In a locked briefcase police also 
found documents and identification in the 
accused’s name along with more heroin, cocaine 
and drug paraphernalia.  
 
About half an hour later the accused arrived by 
car with three associates. Upon arrest, he 
dropped a key ring with keys to the locked filing 
cabinet. He was twice advised of his right to 
counsel under the Charter and of his right to 
remain silent—on his initial arrest and when 
taken inside the building. He asserted his right 
to counsel but was not provided an opportunity 
until over an hour later after he was transported 
to the police station since there was no place at 
the business where a call in private could be 
made.  
 
During the time between his arrest and access 
to a lawyer, a police officer engaged the accused 
in “small talk”, asking him a few curious questions 
about his family. The officer said he told the 
accused he would not use the conversation 
against him nor was it tendered as evidence. 
However, a second officer overheard the 
conversation and was able to identify the 
accused’s voice from an earlier telephone 
conversation in which that officer was working in 
an undercover capacity in the drug investigation. 
In that telephone conversation, the accused 
threatened to kill the undercover officer. This 
officer then spoke the same words the accused 
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threatened and the accused remarked, “Oh, so 
my phones have been tapped.”  In his testimony 
on the voir dire, the officer agreed he 
deliberately made the remark to see what 
reaction the accused would make.   
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused was convicted of possession of 
cocaine and heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking. The trial judge found that the 
statement made by the accused following his 
arrest but before being provided an opportunity 
to contact counsel was not actively elicited and 
therefore his ss. 7 (right to silence) and 10(b) 
(right to counsel) Charter rights were not 
violated and the statement was therefore 
admissible. In his view, the police simply gave 
him the opportunity to speak after the police 
made him aware they knew something about him. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the police used a thinly 
disguised attempt to elicit an inculpatory 
statement from him before he could speak to his 
lawyer. 
 
Between the time an arrestee expresses a desire 
to contact counsel and the time a reasonable 
opportunity is provided to exercise that right, 
the police have a duty to refrain from 
attempting to elicit evidence from the arrestee. 
If the police do not hold off and actively elicit a 
statement, the arrestee’s ss. 7 or s.10(b) rights 
may be violated.  Police conduct beyond the usual 
form of question and answer which creates an 
opportunity for an arrestee to speak ranges 
from being passive—such as leaving a piece of 
evidence in a prominent location at the police 
station where it could be seen by the arrestee—
to the “functional equivalent of an interrogation” 
—such as persisting in conduct effectively 
wearing down an arrestee until they cave in and 
make a statement despite repeatedly asserting a 
right to counsel.  
 
In this case the unanimous appeal court 
dismissed the appeal. The trial judge did not err 
in concluding that police did not elicit the 
statement. Justice Prowse wrote: 
 
While [the “trick” played] was not entirely 
passive, it is difficult to characterize it as 
being the functional equivalent of an 
interrogation. Nor is there any suggestion that 
[the first officer] intended to "set up" [the 
accused] by chatting with him about his family. 
On the contrary, it is apparent from the 
transcript that officer] had no idea of the 
significance of what had transpired between 
[the second officer] and [the accused] until 
later. It is true that [the second officer] was 
hoping that [the accused] would say something 
exculpatory, but the real question is whether 
he breached [the accused’s] rights by his 
conduct. 
 
The administration of justice is not served if 
this Court creates fine distinctions between 
conduct which does and does not amount to 
elicitation giving rise to a breach of an 
accused's Charter rights. The guidelines with 
respect to what constitutes eliciting behaviour 
have been set out by the Supreme Court of 
Canada…. It is up to trial judges to apply those 
general guidelines to the facts before them in 
determining whether the conduct in issue 
amounts to elicitation within the contemplation 
of those cases. This Court will only interfere if 
the finding cannot be justified on the 
evidence, or if the trial judge erred in the 
course of his reasons… In this case, I am not 
persuaded that the trial judge erred in 
concluding that the conduct of the police did 
not constitute elicitation as that word has 
been interpreted by the relevant authorities 
and that [the accused’s] rights under either s. 
7 or 10(b) of the Charter had not been 
breached. [para. 26-27] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Leaders who win the respect of others are the 
ones who deliver more than they promise, not 
the ones who promise more than they can 
deliver—Mark Clement 
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PAT-DOWN NOT FOR SAFETY: 
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED 
R. v. Motevaselan, 2004 BCPC 0362 
 
Officers approached the 
accused to investigate his 
presence in an alley while in 
possession of a high end bicycle. 
As they got closer, they saw a 
marihuana bong attached to the bicycle. The 
accused said the bike was his when asked and 
the officers inferred the bong belonged to him 
as well. The police also saw wire mesh, similar to 
that used for smoking crack cocaine, sticking out 
from his pocket and heard a cell phone in 
possession of the accused ringing constantly. 
The officer placed the accused under 
investigation for possession of drugs, 
handcuffed him and searched through his 
pockets, finding 69 grams of cocaine and 2.5 
grams of heroin.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court, Justice Godfrey concluded the bong, steel 
wool, and cell phone provided only enough 
grounds to investigate—as the officers were 
doing—but not to arrest the accused and search 
him in the manner they did. She held: 
 
Incident to the right of detention for 
investigation is the right of officer safety. 
They were entitled to pat down the accused to 
ensure that he didn't have any weapons on him. 
That is not what they did. They proceeded to 
search him in the fashion that would follow an 
arrest, and that was not open to them, given 
that the accused was simply detained for 
investigation. [para.5] 
 
The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter and the accused was found not guilty. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
The leader who exercises power with honour will 
work from the inside out, starting with himself—
Blaine Lee 
INVESTIGATION OF NEW 
OFFENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE 
PROSPER WARNING  
R. v. M.W.F., 2004 BCCA 425 
 
The accused, a 15 year old 
young offender, was arrested 
by police for assaulting his 
foster mother with a weapon 
and was advised of his right to 
counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter. He was 
taken to the police detachment, reminded of his 
right to counsel, and told police he wanted to 
speak to a lawyer. The accused made a call to 
legal aid, but was unsuccessful speaking to a 
lawyer. However, he did leave a message for a 
lawyer to call him back at the detachment.  
 
About an hour and a half later, while still waiting 
for a return call from legal aid, the accused was 
taken to an interview room where a s.56 Young 
Offenders Act (YOA) statement waiver form 
was completed. Over an 18 minute period, the 
accused was explained his rights including such 
things as not being required to say anything, that 
he could speak to a lawyer free of charge, and 
that he could speak to a lawyer at anytime. The 
officer talked through each item on the form 
and the accused said he understood. He was not 
questioned about the matter relating to his 
arrest, but subsequently confessed during a 
videotaped interview to a sexual assault 
occurring two days earlier that the police were 
investigating and for which he was a suspect.  
The accused’s inculpatory statement was 
admitted at trial in the British Columbia 
Provincial Court and he was convicted of sexual 
assault causing bodily harm.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that his right to 
counsel had been denied. Since he had not been 
able to speak to a lawyer on the matter for 
which he was originally arrested, the accused 
submitted he could not be questioned on other 
matters, despite being explained and 
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BC’s PROPSER WARNING 
You have the right to a reasonable
opportunity to contact counsel.  I am
obliged not to take a statement from
you or  to ask you to participate in any
process which could provide
incriminating evidence until you are
certain about whether you wish to
exercise that right. Do you
understand? What do you wish to do? 
understanding the waiver form. In his view, he 
told the arresting officer he wanted to speak to 
a lawyer and the police had a duty not to 
question him about any matter until he had 
spoken to one. 
 
In a 2:1 judgment, the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. Justice Lowry—with Justice Huddart 
concurring—concluded the accused’s right to 
counsel had not been breached and the 
statement requirements for a young person 
contained in s.56 of the YOA had been followed. 
In addition to the right to counsel under s.10(b) 
of the Charter, ss. 11 and 56 of the YOA provide 
additional rights to a young person. Section 11 
provides a young person with the right “to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay”, to be 
advised of their “right to be represented by 
counsel” and to be “given an opportunity to 
obtain counsel.” Section 56 of the YOA creates a 
number of prerequisites for the admissibility of 
a young person’s statement. These requirements 
include voluntariness, age appropriate 
explanations that they are under no obligation to 
give a statement, any statement may be used as 
evidence, they can consult counsel, and any 
statement must be made with counsel present, 
unless waived. Furthermore, s.56 mandates that 
the young person must be provided a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer and any 
waiver must be videotaped or in writing. If the 
requirements of s.56 are not satisfied, the 
statement will not be admitted as evidence.  
 
In holding that the officer had no duty not to 
attempt to further her investigation on the 
sexual assault or that her efforts did not deny 
the accused an opportunity to exercise his right 
to counsel, Justice Lowry stated: 
 
It is certainly clear that when a person is 
arrested or detained by police who are 
investigating the commission of an offence in 
which the person is thought to be implicated 
and, upon being told the reason for the arrest 
or detention as required, the person wishes to 
consult with counsel, he or she is entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to do so free of any 
attempt to elicit evidence about the matter 
that is the subject of the arrest… 
 
I am, however, unable to accept the notion 
that, in the circumstances, [the sex assault 
investigator] was duty bound not to take the 
opportunity of the [accused] being in the 
detachment to attempt to further her 
investigation of a matter that was entirely 
unrelated to the matter that was the subject 
of his arrest, providing of course that she 
advised him of his rights as required by s. 11 
and reflected in s. 56(2) of the Act.  A person 
who has been arrested or detained may wish to 
consult counsel in respect of one matter but 
not another.  Indeed, that appears to have 
been exactly what the [accused] wished.  What 
is important is that the person be properly 
advised of his or her rights so a proper 
determination in that regard can be made. 
[references omitted, paras. 72-73] 
 
The accused also argued that once a detained 
person has asserted their right to counsel but 
has changed their mind the police must provide 
them with additional information, commonly 
referred to as a Prosper1 warning. This warning 
requires the person be told that they have a 
right to a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel and that the police are required to “hold 
off” from questioning or otherwise requiring the 
person to participate in any potentially 
incriminating process. Justice Lowry, however, 
ruled that this was not a Prosper case. The 
accused had not changed his mind. Rather, he 
wanted to speak with a lawyer in relation to the 
matter for which he was arrested and the 
officer merely 
“raised with him an 
unrelated matter 
requiring that he be 
advised of his right 
to counsel anew.” 
Justice Lowry held: 
 
I do not consider that anything said in Prosper 
requires the police to give a detained person 
both the kind of advice concerning the right to 
                                                 
1 See R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 
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counsel that is routinely given at the outset of 
an arrest or detention as well as the advice 
prescribed in that case at the same time.  It 
must be one or the other.  The latter is to be 
given once there has been a change of mind to 
reinforce the former which will have been 
given at an earlier time.  The purpose of the 
informational advice required when there is a 
change of mind about exercising a right to 
counsel is to insure that the apparent waiver is 
free and voluntary…. 
 
The advice called for in Prosper is to be 
considered in the context of that case….  The 
person arrested in Prosper made an 
incriminating statement after attempting 15 
times over 37 minutes to contact a lawyer 
before giving up in frustration.  There is 
nothing to be taken from the exchange 
between [the officer] and the [accused] that 
suggests he was acting out of frustration when 
he said he did not want to speak to a lawyer 
and proceeded to talk to her about the sexual 
assault. 
 
Given that [the officer] fully informed the 
[accused] of his right to counsel and that he 
was not required to say anything to her about 
the sexual assault, I do not consider she was in 
the circumstances required to say more.  To 
tell him in addition that he was entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer and 
that she could not ask him about the sexual 
assault in the interim would, in my view, have 
added nothing meaningful to the advice he was 
given.  Indeed, it may have been confusing for 
a young person.  What the [accused] needed to 
know was precisely what was explained to him 
as s. 11 of the Act required and he 
acknowledged he understood. [references 
omitted, paras. 80-82] 
 
The officer complied with ss.11 and 56 of the 
YOA and was entitled to interview the accused 
to further her sexual assault investigation. She 
properly advised him of his right to counsel, 
which he declined to exercise. 
 
A Second Opinion 
 
Chief Justice Finch disagreed with the majority. 
First, he outlined several duties imposed on the 
police under s.10(b) of the Charter. They must 
inform the detainee of their right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay including the 
existence and availability of legal aid. If the 
person wants to speak to counsel, the police must 
provide them with a reasonable opportunity to do 
so and refrain from eliciting evidence until the 
reasonable opportunity has been provided. 
Furthermore, he noted: 
 
The right to counsel may impose two further 
duties on the authorities, depending on the 
particular circumstances which confront a 
detainee.  The first arises in situations where 
the nature of the jeopardy facing a detainee 
changes during detention and becomes more 
serious.  In such cases, the authorities are 
under a further duty to advise the detainee of 
the change in jeopardy, remind the detainee of 
his or her right to counsel and provide the 
detainee an opportunity to contact counsel 
again if he or she so desires… 
 
The second additional duty with which the 
authorities may have to comply arises in 
situations where the detainee initially asserts 
his or her right to counsel but, before having 
the opportunity to contact counsel, 
subsequently changes his or her mind and 
decides to waive that right.  In R. v. Prosper, 
the Supreme Court held that in such situations 
the authorities cannot simply accept the 
subsequent waiver, but instead must comply 
with further information duties… 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly 
confirmed that the right to counsel is not 
absolute.  An accused or detainee must be 
reasonably diligent in exercising the right, 
otherwise the implementational duties imposed 
on the authorities are suspended… 
 
In addition, a detainee can waive the right to 
counsel.  The standard for waiver of a Charter 
right is high.  The waiver must be voluntary 
and based on an awareness of the rights being 
waived.  Accordingly, where an accused is not 
properly advised of his or her right to counsel, 
a waiver of that right cannot be 
effective…[references omitted, paras. 27-30] 
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Although the accused was not arguing a s.10(b) 
Charter violation but rather non compliance with 
the YOA, Chief Justice Finch recognized that 
s.10(b) Charter jurisprudence would inform the 
protections afforded by ss.11 and 56 of the 
YOA. Moreover, in Charter cases the accused 
bears the burden of proving a prima facie breach 
of s.10(b) before s.24(2) can be resorted to 
whereas in YOA cases the Crown has the burden 
of proving compliance with s.56, otherwise the 
statement is inadmissible.  In his view, the Crown 
failed to prove a proper waiver.  
 
Although the officer was required to advise the 
accused anew of his right to counsel for the 
second offence, the adequacy of that warning 
must be assessed in context with his earlier 
experience. About two hours earlier he 
expressed a desire to speak with a lawyer after 
being told he had the right to do so. This did not 
happen even though he had waited for a lawyer 
to call back. The police did not tell him he had 
the right to a reasonable opportunity to contact 
a lawyer nor that they could not take a 
statement until he had the reasonable 
opportunity. Chief Justice Finch stated: 
 
In my view, the facts of this case closely 
resemble the type of situation contemplated in 
Prosper, supra where a detainee expresses a 
desire to contact counsel and then 
subsequently changes his or her mind before 
being provided with a reasonable opportunity 
to do so.  Unlike this case, only one offence 
was at issue in Prosper, and the requirement 
for a so-called Prosper warning has generally 
been considered in cases involving only one 
offence…However, in the circumstances of this 
case – given the single episode of detention, 
the close temporal connection between the two 
interviews, and the fact that the police were 
dealing with a young person unfamiliar with the 
criminal justice system – [the accused] was 
entitled to the added informational 
components set out in Prosper.  This is 
consistent with the "special guarantees" 
afforded by s.3(1)(e) of the YOA and the 
Supreme Court of Canada's observation that 
"the particular characteristics of young 
offenders make extra precautions necessary in 
affording them the full protection of their 
Charter rights". [references omitted, para. 43] 
 
Chief Justice Finch would have allowed the 
appeal, ruled the statement inadmissible, and 
directed an acquittal. However, the appeal was 
dismissed since the majority found no error in 
the trial judge’s decision. 
 
Editor’s comments: Although this decision dealt 
with the admissibility of a statement under the 
former Young Offenders Act, the new Youth 
Criminal Justice Act has similar provisions.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
POLICE NEED NOT BE 
EXPLICIT ABOUT COUNSEL OF 
CHOICE INFORMATION 
R. v. Grouse, 2004 NSCA 108 
 
The accused was arrested for 
attempted murder after a rifle 
bullet penetrated the door of a 
police car and entered a police 
officer’s thigh and hand, seriously wounding her. 
The accused was advised of his Charter rights 
and given the usual cautions. He said he wanted 
to talk to his own lawyer (Mr. Mancini), who 
worked with legal aid. A police officer contacted 
the on-call duty counsel, told the lawyer the 
accused wanted to speak with Mr. Mancini and 
the accused spoke to the duty lawyer in private 
on the phone. Fourteen hours later the accused 
was interrogated for over three hours, at which 
time he made inculpatory statements including an 
admission he shot at the police car.  At trial the 
statement was ruled admissible and the accused 
was convicted of intentionally causing bodily 
harm, but appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that he was not properly 
advised of his right to counsel because he was 
not told he had the right to contact counsel of 
his choice.  
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At the time of his arrest the accused was told, 
among other things, that he had “the right to 
retain and instruct a lawyer without delay”, but 
was not told he had the right to retain and 
instruct counsel “of his choice”. In his view, the 
omission of these three words resulted in a 
violation of his rights under s.10(b) of the 
Charter. As a result, he suggested the 
statement should have been excluded. Justice 
Cromwell, authoring the unanimous appeal 
judgment, first reviewed the duties imposed on 
police under s.10(b) of the Charter and clarified 
the issue to be addressed: 
 
[Section 10(b)] imposes two types of duties on 
the police. The first, which flows from its 
opening words, is to afford detained persons 
the right to retain and instruct counsel. This 
has been referred to as the facilitation or 
implementation aspect of s. 10(b). It requires 
the police to provide a detainee who has 
indicated a desire to exercise the right to 
counsel with a reasonable opportunity to do so 
and to refrain from eliciting evidence from the 
detainee until he or she has had that 
reasonable opportunity…The second type of 
duty, which flows from the concluding words 
of the section, has been referred to as the 
informational component. It requires the police 
to inform the detainee of his or her right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
of the existence and availability of legal aid 
and duty counsel… 
 
It is important to understand that this appeal 
relates only to the second of these two types 
of duties. The question raised is whether the 
[accused] was properly informed of his right 
to counsel. I mention this point because the 
arguments on appeal sometimes lost sight of it 
and confused the issue of whether proper 
information had been given with the question 
of whether [the accused] exercised his right 
to counsel diligently. But issues of diligence 
are not relevant if there has been a failure to 
properly advise the detainee of the right to 
counsel. This is because a failure to properly 
advise the detainee is, in itself, a breach of 
the Charter and a failure on the part of the 
detainee to exercise the right to counsel 
diligently after such a breach is 
irrelevant…This, of course, is consistent with 
common sense: a person who is not told about 
the right to counsel cannot be expected to 
exercise it diligently….So the analysis here 
must focus exclusively on the question of 
whether the information given to [the 
accused] satisfied the informational duty of 
the police under s. 10(b); any failure on his 
part to act diligently in pursuit of his right 
cannot cure a breach of the duty to give him 
proper information about it. [references 
omitted, para. 10-11] 
 
In dismissing the appeal, Justice Cromwell ruled 
that the police, in fulfilling the informational 
component of s.10 regarding counsel of choice, 
need not tell an arrestee anything more than 
they have the right to retain and instruct 
counsel. He stated: 
 
However, I am also of the view, subject of 
course to implementation duties, that the law 
did not require the police to do anything to 
communicate [the accused’s] right to counsel 
of choice beyond advising him of his right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay as 
mandated in the leading cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada. I say this for three 
reasons: the authorities do not require more, 
no additional information would be conveyed by 
adding more express information about counsel 
of choice and doing so would not help fulfil the 
purpose of the informational component of s. 
10(b). 
 
The cases from the Supreme Court of Canada 
make it clear that there are three elements of 
the informational duty. The detained person 
must be told: (1) that they have the right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay; (2) 
about access to counsel free of charge where 
the individual meets prescribed financial 
criteria set by provincial legal aid plans; and 
(3) about access to duty counsel and the means 
available to access such services... The 
additional requirement advocated by the 
[accused] is not supported by authority. 
 
Moreover, the addition of a more explicit 
reference to counsel of choice as advocated by 
the [accused] would add nothing to the 
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information conveyed to the detainee. The 
right to retain and instruct counsel means, at 
least, the right to hire a lawyer of the 
detainee's choice. This is the understanding of 
the right on which the cases defining the 
informational requirements have been based. 
The requirements that have been engrafted 
onto the informational component in Brydges 
and Bartle were added to recognize that, 
absent information about legal aid and duty 
counsel, detained persons may think they 
cannot get legal advice other than through 
retaining counsel of their choice. For example, 
in Brydges, the detainee had expressed an 
interest in consulting a lawyer but assumed 
that would not be possible because he could 
not afford to pay. In Bartle, the detainee had 
assumed that a lawyer would not be available 
out of office hours and had no idea of how to 
contact a lawyer at the time of his detention. 
 
Implicit in these cases is that the right to 
retain and instruct counsel is understood to 
refer to privately retained counsel of the 
detained person's choice. Addition of the 
words advocated by the [accused] would, 
therefore, not add anything. 
 
Moreover, the addition of this sort of language 
would not help to achieve the fundamental 
purpose of the duty to advise detained persons 
of their right to retain and instruct counsel. 
The purpose of this informational component is 
to enable a detained person to make an 
informed choice about whether to exercise 
the right to counsel and other Charter rights 
such as the right to silence… The focus of the 
informational component, therefore, is the 
immediate need of the detainee for legal 
advice. The practical problem addressed by 
the cases is not that detainees fail to 
understand that they may hire a lawyer of 
their choice, but rather that they assume this 
right will be of no help in getting the sort of 
immediate advice they require upon 
detention…. 
 
In my view, the addition of the words 
advocated by the [accused] would not advance 
the purpose for which a detainee is told of the 
right to retain and instruct counsel without 
delay. 
The law on the informational component has, 
for the most part, opted for simplicity rather 
than technicality, leaving the precise demands 
of the right to counsel in a particular case to 
be worked out as part of the implementational 
duties of the police rather than by insisting 
that detainees be given a detailed statement 
of what the right to counsel means. The cases 
requiring additional information beyond that 
contained in the words of the Charter itself 
have added information which the courts 
thought was essential to make the right 
meaningful in light of the detained person's 
need for immediate access to legal advice. 
These additions are designed to meet the 
practical needs of the detained person, not to 
assure that the detainee receives a minute 
exposition of the intricacies of the right 
itself. In my view, no such rationale can be 
advanced for the addition proposed by the 
[accused]. 
 
I recognize, as the [accused] points out, that 
many of the forms of caution in use across the 
country appear to have explicit words to the 
effect that the detainee has the right to 
counsel of choice. I am not suggesting that 
these cautions are therefore inappropriate. I 
simply conclude that there is no constitutional 
requirement that the detainee be advised of 
his or her right to retain and instruct counsel 
in a way that more explicitly points out that, as 
is undoubtedly the case, the right is to counsel 
of choice. [references omitted, paras. 22-29] 
 
Furthermore, even if there was a requirement 
for the police to be more explicit about 
consulting counsel of choice, the police 
nonetheless adequately informed the accused of 
that right in the circumstances and he 
understood from what he was told he had the 
right to retain and instruct counsel of his choice. 
After reading the accused his rights the officer 
asked him if he had a lawyer. He immediately 
named Mr. Mancini. As Justice Cromwell noted, 
the accused “immediately asserted the right to 
consult with a lawyer of his own choice.”  The 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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STATEMENT ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE s.10(b) VIOLATION 
R. v. C.J.L., 2004 MBCA 126 
 
The accused, a suspect in a 
sexual assault case against his 
five year old niece, attended the 
police station for an interview. 
He was advised of his right to 
counsel, but was told he could have legal aid if he 
was charged with an offence. This warning did 
not conform strictly with s.10(b) Charter 
requirements. At his trial in the Manitoba Court 
of Queen’s Bench, the trial judge concluded that 
the accused was aware of legal aid before his 
statement was made, but understood it was only 
available if he was charged and during trial. 
Despite finding a s.10(b) violation, the judge 
nevertheless admitted the accused’s statement, 
which was exculpatory in nature but 
nevertheless used to cross examine him. The 
accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the statement—
which followed a Charter breach—should have 
been excluded. The unanimous Manitoba Court of 
Appeal, however, found the statement properly 
admitted. 
 
When determining whether evidence following a 
Charter breach will be admissible pursuant to 
s.24(2), courts use a framework that analyzes 
three factors: 
 
• the nature of the evidence and its impact, if 
admitted, on trial fairness; 
• the seriousness of the Charter violation; and 
• the effect of excluding the evidence on the 
repute of the administration of justice. 
 
Nature of the Evidence 
 
The accused suggested that since the statement 
was conscriptive evidence—created by the 
Charter breach—the trial would be rendered 
unfair by admitting it. However, Justice 
Feldman, authoring the unanimous judgment, 
noted that not all evidence flowing from a s.10(b) 
breach is always inadmissible. He stated: 
 
As has been made clear in a number of 
[Supreme Court of Canada] cases to be 
conscriptive, evidence must be compelled by 
the authorities from the accused. Evidence 
obtained in violation of s. 10(b) is prima facie 
compelled, and thus conscriptive evidence but 
it is not, for that reason, automatically 
excluded. [references omitted, para. 20] 
 
In this case the trial judge had found that the 
accused would have talked to police even if he 
had been told legal aid was immediately available. 
In other words, the Charter violation had no 
impact on his interview with police—he would 
have talked anyway because he wanted to help 
his position. The Manitoba Court of Appeal would 
not interfere with the trial judge’s assessment 
that the admission of the statement would not 
adversely impact trial fairness.  
 
Seriousness of the Violation 
 
Although a s.10(b) breach itself may be a serious 
Charter violation and render a statement 
inadmissible, this was not one such case.  Justice 
Feldman wrote: 
 
Here, there was a partial, but incomplete and 
incorrect, provision of s. 10(b) information. 
There was no attempt to mislead 
(acknowledged by the accused), and there was, 
I am satisfied, no bad faith on the part of the 
police. This is a breach that is neither trivial 
nor egregious. My judgment is that, in all the 
circumstances, it is less serious, rather than 
more, and not so serious as to compel 
exclusion. [para. 28] 
 
Effect on the Administration of Justice 
 
The charge of sexual assault is extremely 
serious and the accused’s statement was used 
only to cross examine him and challenge his 
credibility. Justice Feldman ruled that its 
exclusion, not its admission, could bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute: 
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I cannot say with any certainty that the 
statement was of no value to the Crown's case. 
Excluding this evidence in this serious case, 
where there was very little else, if anything, 
apart from the accused's own testimony, that 
might reasonably touch directly on his 
credibility, could well bring into disrepute the 
administration of justice… I would say the 
system's reputation would be better served by 
its admission. [references omitted, para. 30] 
 
The statement was properly admitted but a new 
trial was ordered on other grounds. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
SMELL OF LIQUOR 
SUFFICIENT FOR PROPER 
ROADSIDE DEMAND 
R. v. Butchko, 2004 SKCA 159 
 
The police stopped a vehicle with 
three occupants after it was 
observed leaving a liquor 
establishment, make a u-turn, 
accelerate, and fishtail. An odour 
of alcohol was detected coming from the vehicle. 
The driver was asked to step out of the vehicle 
and the officer detected a strong smell of 
alcohol on his breath. When asked if he had 
anything to drink the driver replied that he had 
not. The driver was read the roadside screening 
demand, but refused to provide a sample and he 
was charged with refusal.  
 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court2, 
the accused submitted that the smell of alcohol 
on his breath, by itself, was insufficient in 
providing a reasonable suspicion that he had 
alcohol in his body and that the officer required 
additional objective indicia of consumption. The 
accused filed expert evidence that the smell of 
alcohol detected on a person’s breath may not be 
indicative of alcohol in the body because the 
ethanol may have been eliminated, while the 
chemical causing the odour has not. In other 
                                                 
2 2003 SKPC 76 
words, the smell of alcohol may be present in a 
person’s breath without alcohol being in their 
body. In concluding that the odour was 
sufficient to provide the necessary level of 
suspicion, Justice Whelan stated: 
 
I accept that the Officer genuinely possessed 
the suspicion and believed it to be reasonable. 
An objective scrutiny requires that I find the 
Officer’s suspicion was reasonable. I don’t 
believe that it requires that the Officer’s 
evidence be scrutinized in light of all the 
evidence before the Court. It’s sufficient to 
ask; whether a reasonable person, standing in 
the officer’s shoes, with the officer’s 
knowledge, would have had a reasonable 
suspicion.  
 
The accused was convicted but appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. Queen’s 
Bench Justice Klebuc allowed the appeal3, set 
aside the conviction and entered an acquittal. In 
his view, the smell of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath was not sufficient to provide a 
reasonable suspicion that there was alcohol in his 
body. Therefore, there was no valid basis for 
the roadside demand and no requirement for the 
accused to comply. The Crown appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
 
In a unanimous judgment the conviction was 
restored. Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code 
allows a police officer to make a roadside 
demand if they reasonably suspect the driver 
has alcohol in their body. The legal threshold, 
reasonable suspicion, is low and does not require 
a belief that a crime has been committed. 
Justice Cameron, delivering the judgment of the 
court, adopted the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
view4 where it was ruled that a smell of alcohol 
on a driver’s breath was sufficient to found a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver had alcohol 
in their body. Even though an explanation for the 
odour of alcohol may be offered, it does not 
detract from the officer’s reasonable suspicion.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
                                                 
3 2004 SKQB 140 
4 R. v.Lindsay (1999), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 159 (Ont.C.A.) 
 Volume 5 Issue 1             www.jibc.bc.ca 
January/February 2005 
19
ALCOHOL TESTING:  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBATION CONDITION  
R. v. Shoker, 2004 BCCA 643 
 
The accused was convicted of 
break and enter to a dwelling 
house with the intent to commit 
a sexual assault. He had entered 
the victim’s home, undressed 
himself, and tried to climb into her bed. The 
victim called 9-1-1 and the accused was 
subsequently arrested. As part of his sentence, 
he was placed on probation for two years with 
several conditions, including one that he abstain 
from the possession and consumption of alcohol 
and non prescription narcotics and that he 
submit to a urinalysis, blood test or breathalyzer 
test upon demand of a peace officer to ensure 
compliance with the condition. The accused 
appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that this 
probation condition was unreasonable under s.8 
of the Charter because there was no 
requirement that reasonable grounds were 
necessary before such a demand for samples was 
made. 
 
In a 2:1 decision, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal held that the condition was 
unconstitutional. Although s.732.1 of the Criminal 
Code allows a sentencing judge to impose a 
requirement that the probationer submit to 
tests of bodily substances, the condition 
imposed was unreasonable and violated s.8 
because “there are no legislative or regulatory 
standards or safeguards for the protection of 
the [accused’s] privacy in the enforcement of 
the condition.” Justice Levine, authoring the 
majority judgment, wrote: 
 
In the absence of standards and safeguards 
for the protection of the liberty, privacy and 
safety of the offender, the condition requiring 
the [accused] to submit to a urinalysis, blood 
test or breathalyzer test on demand has the 
potential to be applied arbitrarily. Although ss. 
732.1(c) and (h) may authorize the imposition 
of such a condition, neither they nor the 
condition provides the appropriate standards 
and safeguards present in other statutory 
regimes for similar types of searches. In the 
absence of such a regime, the offender cannot 
be said to be “secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure”. 
 
One of the missing safeguards in the probation 
condition is the requirement that the 
probation or peace officer have reasonable and 
probable grounds for suspecting or believing 
that the offender has breached the 
abstention condition. If amending the 
condition to add that requirement would cure 
the constitutional defects, this Court could 
order that the condition be amended in that 
manner. [para. 55-56] 
 
However, simply amending the condition requiring 
the presence of reasonable grounds, in the 
court’s view, would not conform the condition 
with s.8. There still would be no safeguards in 
place, such as how samples are to be collected or 
used. Although an offender’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is reduced because they 
have been convicted of an offence and no longer 
enjoy the presumption of innocence, s.8 
nonetheless protects this lower privacy interest, 
which extends to the taking of breath, urine or 
blood. Despite the impact this ruling may have on 
enforcing non consumption orders, the court left 
it to government to change the law:    
 
I am aware that striking down this commonly 
used condition may create difficulty in the 
enforcement of abstention conditions in 
probation orders. I consider that there is a 
gap in the legislation that is the role of 
Parliament, not the courts, to fill. Parliament 
may wish to enact appropriate standards and 
safeguards for demanding bodily samples from 
offenders on probation to help authorities 
determine whether such offenders are in 
compliance with conditions to abstain from the 
consumption of alcohol and drugs. In the 
absence of such provisions, however, probation 
officers and police officers must rely on other 
methods of enforcing conditions of abstention, 
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including testimony as to the reasonable 
grounds for believing that a person has 
breached the condition… [references omitted, 
para. 60]  
 
A Different View 
 
Justice Hall, took a different view. In his opinion 
the condition, as it stood, was unconstitutional 
because it did not require reasonable grounds 
that the probationer had ingested alcohol or 
drugs before a demand could be made. However, 
if reasonable grounds were a requirement to a 
demand, the breath and urine tests would not be 
constitutionally defective. The blood test, on the 
other hand, would be inappropriate.  Justice Hall 
wrote: 
 
When considering whether the testing 
requirements ordered by the sentencing judge 
ought to be found to meet constitutional 
requirements it seems to me that the degree 
of intrusiveness of the tests is a very relevant 
factor to consider.  This order provides for 
three possible tests: a breath test, urinalysis 
and a blood sample.  In my view, having regard 
to the fact that this [accused] has been 
convicted and is on probation, he has a 
somewhat lowered expectation of interference 
by state agents…. 
 
The taking of a sample of the breath of an 
individual seems to me to not be in any way an 
invasive procedure or an interference with 
bodily integrity.  The taking of a sample of 
urine for urinalysis is also not an invasive 
procedure provided privacy is afforded for the 
taking of the sample.  Many persons do this 
every day for medical health testing purposes 
and it in no way interferes with bodily 
integrity… These two types of testing required 
by Condition 9 of this probation order, if 
conditioned upon the requirement that such a 
test can only be demanded upon reasonable and 
probable grounds, appear to me to pass 
constitutional muster.  I do, however, consider 
that the requirement for a blood test found in 
this Condition is constitutionally unacceptable.  
Blood testing is an invasive procedure – the 
skin of the subject is broken and a substance 
not normally excreted by the body under 
natural processes is obtained by an agent of 
the state.  This sort of procedure is normally 
performed by someone trained in medical 
procedures and is done at a medical lab or the 
offices of a medical professional.  Such a 
procedure seems to me very different in kind 
or genus from the aforementioned breath and 
urine tests. [references omitted, paras. 77-
78] 
 
In Justice Hall’s view, a blood test procedure 
would require a detailed statutory regime that is 
not presently be found in s.732.1 of the Criminal 
Code. 
 
The appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
probation condition was amended accordingly. He 
was now only required to abstain from 
intoxicants without a requirement he submit to 
testing.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
NO NEED TO REITERATE 
s.10(b) IF ACCUSED 
UNDERSTANDS JEOPARDY 
R. v. Jones, 
(2004) Docket:C34364 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested by 
Peel police and advised of his 
right to counsel. He said he did 
not want to call a lawyer and 
was again advised of his right to 
counsel before he was interviewed at the police 
station. About three hours later the accused was 
interviewed by Toronto police officers 
investigating the robbery of a Toronto-Dominion 
Bank. Again he was told of his right to counsel 
under s.10(b) of the Charter but did not wish to 
speak to a lawyer. The accused confessed to 
robbing the bank and said he had robbed others.  
 
He agreed to provide a video taped statement 
and was told he could discuss the other 
robberies then. At the beginning of the video 
taped statement the accused was again reminded 
he could speak to a lawyer but declined. He 
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LEGAL LANGUAGE 
Certiorari—a writ issued from a
superior court inquiring into the
validity of proceedings in an
inferior court and commonly used
for the purpose of quashing
orders. 
Mandamus—a writ issued by a
superior court used to ensure the
proper exercise of discretion. 
provided a full confession to robbing the 
Toronto-Dominion Bank  and also admitted to 
robbing several other specific banks when 
questioned. He also identified himself in 
surveillance photographs taken during the 
robberies. He was convicted by a jury in the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice on seven 
counts of robbery and other related offences.  
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the police failed to 
advise him of his right to counsel when the police 
discretely, but fundamentally changed their 
questioning from the Toronto-Dominion Bank 
robbery to the other robberies in the course of 
the video taped confession. The appeal court, 
however, disagreed: 
 
The [accused] was fully aware of his right to 
counsel.  He had been told of that right on 
four occasions and declined to speak with a 
lawyer.  When he was reminded of his right to 
counsel at the outset of the videotaped 
statement, he knew that the police were going 
to question him about the Toronto-Dominion 
Bank robbery and any other robberies that the 
[accused] was prepared to tell the police 
about.  He understood the nature of his 
jeopardy.  He knew that it would extend to any 
of the bank robberies that he chose to tell the 
police about.  The [accused] had sufficient 
information to permit him to make an informed 
decision as to whether he wished to speak to a 
lawyer before talking to the police about the 
various robberies he had committed…[para. 9] 
 
The statement had been properly admitted and 
the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Nothing so conclusively proves a man's ability to 
lead others as what he does from day to day to 
lead himself—Thomas J. Watson 
 
 
JUDGE LACKS JURISDICTION 
FOR EXCLUSIVE RELEASE 
HEARING 
R. v. Davidson, 2004 ABCA 337 
 
After failing to appear in court 
on a probation violation, a 
provincial court judge issued an 
arrest warrant requiring the 
accused be brought before him to speak to 
release. The warrant was executed but a justice 
of the peace declined to conduct a release 
hearing because of the endorsement requiring 
the accused be brought before the judge issuing 
the warrant. The accused successfully filed a 
motion in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
seeking an order of certiorari and mandamus. 
The Queen’s Bench judge concluded the 
Provincial Court judge lacked jurisdiction to 
affix the condition that the accused be brought 
before him. A release hearing was ordered. The 
Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that 
a provincial court 
judge does have 
jurisdiction to 
endorse an arrest 
warrant reserving 
exclusive jurisdiction 
to hold release 
hearings.  
 
Section 511(1)(c) of the Criminal Code directs 
that “a warrant issued under this Part shall...( c) 
order that the accused be forthwith arrested 
and brought before the judge or justice who 
issued the warrant or before some other judge 
or justice having jurisdiction in the same 
territorial division, to be dealt with according to 
law.” Crown submitted that this section clearly 
authorized the judge issuing the warrant to 
specify that the accused be brought before 
them, rather than another justice or judge. The 
accused, on the other hand, asserted he must be 
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brought before the issuing judge or another 
judge or justice having territorial jurisdiction. 
 
The unanimous Alberta Court of Appeal ruled 
that any endorsement reserving exclusive 
jurisdiction is improper. Section 511 must be 
read in a way that conforms with the duty of a 
peace officer to bring an arrestee before a 
justice without unreasonable delay under s.503 
of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, an 
endorsement reserving exclusive jurisdiction for 
release hearings may unnecessarily prolong an 
arrestee’s detention in contravention of ss.7 and 
9 of the Charter. Section 9, the provision 
protecting a person from arbitrary detention, in 
addition to a person’s right to a bail hearing 
without unreasonable delay, support an 
interpretation of s.511 that reduces—not 
prolongs—the period of time between arrest and 
a release hearing. The members of the court 
stated:  
 
In our view, the section, read as a whole, is 
clear and sets out what a peace officer must 
be directed to do upon arrest. The officer is 
to be given an initial choice of either bringing 
the accused before the judge or justice 
issuing the warrant, or bringing the accused 
before “another justice within the same 
territorial jurisdiction.” Such an interpretation 
follows from the use of the word “or” and the 
fact that the statute provides an option. If 
the peace officer chooses to bring the 
accused before the judge or justice issuing 
the warrant, however, and the judge or justice 
is not available, he or she must then seek out 
another judge or justice to comply with the 
statutory injunction that the entire process be 
accomplished “forthwith.” Furthermore, we 
note that when a warrant is issued by a 
justice, rather than a Queen’s Bench judge, 
section 2 of the Criminal Code makes clear 
that the phrase “another justice” includes 
either a Provincial Court judge or a Justice of 
the Peace. 
 
It follows that a warrant cannot be endorsed 
to require that an accused be brought back 
before the issuer alone to speak to release. 
 
As well as being consistent with the words of 
the statute, this interpretation of s. 511avoids 
conflict with the right of an arrested party, 
found in s. 503 of the Criminal Code, to seek 
release on bail without unreasonable delay. The 
law on bail makes it clear that if an accused is 
not released by the peace officer or the 
officer in charge, there is a duty to bring the 
accused into the judicial process without delay. 
This is to ensure that a person is not held 
incommunicado…It is a fundamental 
cornerstone of criminal procedure intended to 
ensure that the arrest and detention are 
brought to an impartial judicial officer as soon 
as possible. This right is clearly enshrined in 
ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter. [references 
omitted, paras. 22-24] 
 
And further: 
 
The final factor supporting our interpretation 
of s. 511 is that it best suits the 
effective administration of justice. Arrest 
warrants issued from the bench, or pursuant 
to an information, oblige the police to arrest 
an accused and present him or her before the 
court. The peace officers charged with this 
task, however, have neither the time nor the 
resources to wait for a judge or justice who 
has issued a warrant to make himself available. 
Nor are the interests of justice served by 
keeping arrested people in custody, when they 
are likely candidates for bail, just because it is 
necessary to comply with a particular judge or 
justice’s schedule. Along with being unfair, this 
is also an inefficient use of custodial 
resources. [para. 30] 
 
Thus, the Alberta Court of Appeal concluded, 
“there is no jurisdiction under s.511(c) for 
Provincial Court judges to seize themselves of 
release hearings to the exclusion of the other 
mechanisms provided for in the Criminal Code.”  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Anyone can steer the ship when the sea is calm—
Publius Syrus 
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ADJUDICATOR MAY INFER 
PROPER DEMAND  
FOR ADP 
Taylor v. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles,  
2004 BCCA 641 
 
A driver was stopped for 
speeding and the officer noted a 
smell of liquor on his breath and 
other signs of intoxication. He 
admitted to consuming beer and 
subsequently failed a roadside screening test. 
The breathalyzer demand was read but the 
petitioner refused to provide a breath sample. 
As a consequence, he was issued with an 
administrative driving prohibition under the 
Motor Vehicle Act. The driver was then issued a 
promise to appear for impaired driving and 
refusal under s.254 of the Criminal Code and 
driven home. 
 
The driver applied for a review of the 
administrative driving prohibition. He argued 
that the report submitted by the officer in 
support of the prohibition indicated that a 
“demand” was refused, but it was unclear what 
type of demand was made—breath samples, 
identification, assistance, or to follow the 
officer? In his submission, there was no direct 
link from the demand on the card to the demand 
required under s.254 and it was therefore not 
possible for the adjudicator to find that a s.254 
breath demand had been made.   
 
The adjudicator, however, inferred that when 
the officer said she read the breath demand in 
her report that she read the demand from a 
standard card issued to police officers. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
Justice Grist set aside the decision of the 
adjudicator because there was “no evidentiary 
basis of what was actually said and no basis for 
the assessment of the quality of the demand.” 
Simply because the demand was made from a 
card did not support the inference it was made 
from the standard card kept by officers that 
set out a breath demand that complies with 
s.254. The Superintendent of Motor Vehicles 
then appealed Justice Grist’s decision to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal.  
 
In a unanimous judgment, the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Justice 
Newbury, authoring the court’s opinion, stated: 
 
We need not decide whether the facts here 
will support a criminal conviction, although I 
take [the driver’s] point that a divergence 
between the criminal statute and the Motor 
Vehicle Act on points such as this would be 
undesirable.  The fact remains that the 
adjudicator here is held only to a civil standard 
and is not bound by the normal rules of 
evidence, and that the standard of review is 
one of patent unreasonableness.  Applying 
these standards, I am of the view that it 
cannot be said the adjudicator's decision was 
patently unreasonable.  Indeed, I think the 
adjudicator was entitled to take notice of the 
contents of the cards carried by police 
officers providing the officially sanctioned 
wording for demands under s. 254 for breath 
or blood.  The box on the form ticked by the 
constable was evidence that the demand had 
been made.  It would, in my view, be carrying 
technicality much too far to require that the 
actual wording be provided to the adjudicator 
before could infer what words were used and 
whether a proper demand was made.  The 
purpose of the cards carried by police officers 
is to ensure that approved wording is used 
uniformly and that disputes of this kind do not 
arise.  The fact that the police officer did not 
write out in longhand the warning she gave is 
not in my opinion fatal to the validity of the 
demand and constitutes evidence reasonably 
capable of supporting the adjudicator's 
conclusion that a demand was made under s. 
254 of the Criminal Code. [para. 6] 
 
The adjudicator’s decision—inferring the 
reading of the proper breath demand—was 
restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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WITHOUT DETENTION, NO 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
R. v. Bottle, 2004 BCSC 1667 
 
After stopping the accused for 
going 105 km/h in a 100 km/h 
zone and for no licence plate 
light, a police officer issued him 
a notice and order and speeding 
warning. A CPIC query revealed the accused had 
a criminal record, including drug offences. As 
the accused was about to get back into his 
vehicle—a Ford Expedition—the officer asked 
him if he minded being asked some questions. 
The accused said no and walked back to the 
officer where he was asked, among other things, 
if he had any firearms, stolen property or 
narcotics. The accused answered no, but with 
downcast eyes, which differed from his other 
responses. This aroused the officer’s suspicion 
and the accused was asked if he minded his 
vehicle being searched. He replied, “No, I don’t.”  
 
The officer then completed a written consent to 
search form, which the accused signed. The 
officer then entered the passenger’s side of the 
vehicle and smelled raw marihuana. The officer 
asked the accused if he was a user and smoked 
marihuana. The accused said yes and produced a 
tin containing marihuana roaches. He was then 
arrested for possession of marihuana and 
informed of his rights under s.10(b) of the 
Charter. He declined counsel and was advised of 
his right to remain silent. 
 
The officer returned to the vehicle and 
continued the search, finding a golf travel bag 
containing three pails of cannabis bud. The 
accused was then arrested for possession for 
the purpose of trafficking and again was 
Chartered and warned. He now wanted to call a 
lawyer. During a voir dire in the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia the officer testified he did 
not have reasonable grounds to search, but only 
a suspicion and that he would have let the 
accused go if he had not consented.  
 
The accused argued he had been arbitrarily 
detained (s.9), denied his right to counsel 
(s.10(b)), and subject to an unreasonable search 
(s.8), contrary to the Charter. Justice Meiklem, 
however, disagreed. Charter rights under s.9 and 
10 are only engaged if there is a detention. In 
this case, the officer’s extra questioning did not 
amount to a detention. The accused was told he 
was free to go before questioning began. 
Furthermore, there is no stand alone right to 
counsel in non-detention circumstances before 
obtaining consent. Finally, the consent obtained 
was valid. The informational components of 
proper consent had been conveyed in the consent 
to search form. The Crown rebutted the 
presumption of a warrantless search and no s.8 
breach had been established. The evidence was 
admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
RECORDING DEVICES 
ALLOWED IN BC COURTS 
 
On December 13, 2004 
British Columbia Provincial 
Court Chief Judge Baird Ellan 
released a revised media 
policy, which now permits 
recording devices in provincial 
courtrooms. Generally, the policy of the court 
was to prohibit the use of recording devices. 
Now, accredited journalists presenting an 
Accreditation Card to the sheriff will be allowed 
to bring recording devices into the courtroom. 
However, recording devices may only be used if 
they do not disrupt the proceedings and their 
use does not impose any extra expense on the 
court. Furthermore, the recordings may only be 
used to verify a journalist’s notes. The 
recordings may not be copied or used in any 
other way, such as for broadcast. Despite this 
new policy, a presiding judge retains the 
discretion to exclude recording devices in a case 
or part of a proceeding. For more information on 
this new policy check www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
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ON-DUTY DEATHS RISE 
 
On-duty peace officer 
deaths in Canada rose 
by one in 2004. Last 
year, seven peace 
officers lost their lives 
on the job. This is one 
death above the 10-year 
lows of six deaths in 
1996, 1998, 1999 and 
2003.   
 
Motor vehicles, not guns, posed the greatest risk 
to officers. Over the last 10 years, 37 officers 
have lost their lives in circumstances involving 
vehicles, including automobile and motorcycle 
accidents (26), vehicular assault (2), and being 
struck by a vehicle (9). These deaths account for 
nearly 50% of all on-duty deaths, which is more 
than three times the next leading causes of 
aircraft accidents and gunfire, each taking 11 
lives from 1995 to 2004. On average, 15 officers 
every two years lost their lives during the last 
decade, while 1997 and 2002 had the most 
deaths at 11 per year.  
 
 “They are our heroes.  
We shall not forget them.”5 
 
                                                 
5 Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings 
2004 Roll of Honour 
 
Corporal James Galloway 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: February 28, 2004  
Cause of Death: Gunfire  
 
Constable Chris Garrett 
Cobourg Police Service, ON 
End of Watch: May 17, 2004 
Cause of Death: Stabbed 
 
Constable Tyler Boutilier 
Ontario Provincial Police, ON 
End of Watch: May 23, 2004 
Cause of Death: Automobile accident  
 
Parole Officer Louise Pargeter 
Correctional Service of Canada, CAN 
End of Watch: October 6, 2004 
Cause of Death: Assault  
 
Customs Inspector Adam Angel 
Canada Border Services Agency, CAN 
End of Watch: October 17, 2004 
Cause of Death: Heart attack 
 
Auxiliary Constable Glen Evely 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: November 13, 2004 
Cause of Death: Vehicular Assault  
 
Constable Michael Siydock 
Ontario Provincial Police, ON 
End of Watch: November 26, 2004 
Cause of Death: Heart attack 
Canadian Peace Officer On Duty Deaths (by year) 
Cause 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 Total 
Aircraft accident  2  1 2 1  4  1 11 
Assault 1          1 
Auto accident 1 3 5 2 1 1 2 2 2 4 23 
Drowned    1   1 1 1  4 
Fall     1      1 
Gunfire 1  1 2    3 2 2 11 
Heart attack 2  1  1  1 1   6 
Motorcycle accident  1   2      3 
Natural disaster   1        1 
Stabbed 1      1    2 
Struck by vehicle   3  2 2 1  1  9 
Training accident    1  1     2 
Vehicular assault 1     1     2 
Total 7 6 11 7 9 6 6 11 6 7 76 
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page www.odmp.org/canada [accessed January 21, 2005] 
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MERE POSSIBILITY 
CONVERSATION OVERHEARD 
NOT A s.10(b) BREACH 
R. v. O’Donnell, 2004 NBCA 26 
 
The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving, Chartered and 
warned and read the 
breathalyzer demand. After 
speaking to his lawyer on a 
telephone located in a small room with the door 
partially open, he provided a breathalyzer sample 
and failed, resulting in a charge of over 80mg%. 
During a voir dire in New Brunswick Provincial 
Court to determine the admissibility of the 
breathalyzer certificate, the accused testified 
that although he could hear voices outside the 
phone room—but not the words—it did not 
interfere with his conversation with his lawyer. 
The officer testified he did not hear the 
accused’s conversation with counsel.   
 
The Provincial Court judge concluded that the 
accused’s right to counsel under s.10(b) of the 
Charter had been infringed because it was 
“theoretically” possible for the officer to hear 
what was being said, but the certificate was 
admitted in any event pursuant to s.24(2). The 
accused was convicted. He appealed to the New 
Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench arguing the 
trial judge erred in admitting the certificate, 
but his appeal was dismissed. In the appeal court 
justice’s opinion, the mere possibility that the 
accused’s conversation could be overheard was 
insufficient for a s.10(b) breach. The accused 
further appealed to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal. 
 
Justice Robertson, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, first examined the test for privacy 
included in s.10(b), stating: 
 
It is settled law that the right to retain and 
instruct counsel, under s. 10(b) of the Charter, 
includes a corollary right to consult in private. 
Without the requisite degree of privacy, the 
constitutional right to counsel becomes 
illusory. Although waiver of the right is a 
possibility, the issue does not arise in the 
present case. While the amount of privacy 
need not be great, at a minimum, an accused 
must be able to converse with his or her 
lawyer without the conversation being 
overheard. Moreover, those who exercise their 
right to counsel are not required to request 
privacy or greater privacy than what the police 
are willing to provide. Furthermore, the right 
to consult in private extends to legal advice 
that is sought over the telephone and it 
matters not whether the advice sought is of 
minimal scope (whether to provide breath 
samples). Indeed, nearly all the privacy cases 
involve telephone consultations following a 
demand for breath samples… 
 
The legal rationale for the privacy requirement 
is not complicated. An accused must be able to 
discuss the circumstances of his or her 
detention without fear of being overheard… 
 
In theory, a frank exchange between an 
accused and counsel may require the making of 
incriminating statements if uttered in the 
presence of the police. Without privacy, the 
law presumes that an accused was unable to 
converse freely, thereby affecting his or her 
ability to obtain advice and make an informed 
decision as to what should be said or 
done…[paras. 4-6, references omitted] 
 
The Court of Appeal then reviewed four tests to 
determine which one was the appropriate test 
for determining whether the right to consult 
counsel in private was infringed. These tests 
were articulated as follows: 
 
1. the accused must establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the police did in fact 
overhear the accused’s conversation with 
counsel; 
 
2. the accused must establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, that it was more probable than 
not that the police did or could overhear the 
accused’s conversation with counsel. The term 
“could” in this context means a “real” or 
“substantial” possibility; 
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3. the accused must establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, that there was a possibility the 
police overheard the accused’s conversation 
with counsel. This test recognizes a breach 
when there is a “theoretical” or “mere 
possibility” that police overheard the 
privileged conversation, such as failing to 
close the door to the room where the accused 
is speaking with his lawyer on the telephone; 
or 
 
4. the accused must establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the accused reasonably 
believed that the police could overhear the 
accused’s conversation with counsel and 
whether this belief inhibited the accused’s 
conversation with counsel. This two-prong 
test, referred to as the “reasonable 
apprehension test”, is subjective—it focuses 
on what the accused thought—and requires 
the accused to have suffered prejudice—
their ability to effectively communicate with 
counsel was affected (they would have acted 
differently but for their privacy violation). 
 
Justice Robertson rejected test 1, 3, and 4 and 
chose the second test as the correct one to 
apply as the test for privacy. He held: 
 
The second formulation poses the following 
question: whether it was more probable than 
not that the police did or could overhear the 
accused's telephone conversation with counsel. 
What sets this formulation apart from the 
first test is that emphasis is also placed on 
whether the police "could" have overheard the 
conversation, in addition to whether they 
actually "did". In my view, this is the proper 
test. It recognizes that uncertainty over 
whether the accused was denied the requisite 
degree of privacy may be resolved in favour of 
the accused. Consequently, the test can be 
applied without the court having to make a 
credibility finding either for the police or the 
accused. Moreover, the test is objective in 
that it is applied from the viewpoint of a 
disinterested observer. I hasten to add that 
to distinguish the second formulation from the 
third, it is necessary to ask whether, on a 
balance of probabilities, there was a "real" or 
"substantial" possibility that the police could 
have overheard the accused's conversation 
with counsel. Above all else, it is important to 
recognize that there is no room in law for the 
third and fourth formulations of the test. 
[para. 12] 
 
In this case, the trial judge erred. He applied 
the mere possibility standard. The theoretical 
possibility that the police were able to overhear 
the accused’s conversation with his lawyer was 
insufficient to find a breach of his privacy right 
under s.10(b) of the Charter.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
ADDITIONAL SENTENCE 
INVALIDATES PROBATION 
ORDER 
R. v. Amyotte, 2005 BCCA 12 
 
The accused was sentenced to 
two years in prison for 
possession of stolen property 
and 30 days concurrent for 
possession of cocaine and two 
years probation following each sentence. Some 
19 months later he was sentenced to a further 
20 months for theft, to be served concurrently 
with his earlier two year term. With the five 
month overlap, the accused’s sentence would 
total more than 40 months. The accused 
appealed his sentence to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal with respect to the probation 
orders, arguing they were invalid. 
 
Under s.731(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, a 
probation order may be imposed on an offender 
if the offender is sentenced to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding two years. Furthermore, 
s.139(1) of the Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act deems a person sentenced to 
additional time while currently serving a 
sentence to be sentenced to one sentence, 
starting at the beginning of the first sentence 
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and ending at the expiration of the last 
sentence.   
 
In this case the sentenced overlapped by about 
five months and the total sentence, when adding 
the two sentences together, exceeded two years 
(see Figure 1). Therefore, the probation orders, 
which were initially valid when imposed on the 
first sentence, became invalid when the second 
sentence was imposed.  
 
Figure 1 
 
1st  sentence: 2 years  
 2nd sentence: 20 months 
Total sentence: 3 years 4 months and 13 days 
 
The probation orders were quashed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
ARREST 
R. v. Scott, 2004 NSCA 141 
 
Following the early morning 
robbery of a convenience store 
by a female wearing a ski mask, 
a police tracking dog traced 
footprints in the fresh snow to 
an apartment building. On the approach to the 
parking lot of the apartment building, police saw 
a red or wine coloured Grand Prix or Grand AM 
leaving the parking lot at an unusually high speed. 
Shortly thereafter two police officers observed 
a wine coloured Grand Prix enter a service 
station. The officers approached the 
occupants—the accused and her adult male 
companion—and asked them to submit to a pat 
down search. Although they were not arrested, 
officers accompanied them as they went about 
their business at the service station for about 
half an hour. In the meantime, police determined 
the male companion had a criminal record and 
was recently released on parole. The two were 
subsequently arrested, given the police caution, 
read their Charter rights, and transported 
separately to the police detachment.  
 
At the detachment the accused asked to speak 
with a lawyer, which was facilitated. Shortly 
afterwards, she was asked if she would consent 
to a search of her residence. After the accused 
said she would not say anything until she saw her 
11 year old daughter, the police drove her home, 
picked up the daughter, and brought them both 
back to the detachment. Police then asked the 
accused to sign a consent to search form, told 
her she was a suspect in a robbery and again 
advised her she was entitled to speak to a 
lawyer. After speaking with counsel a second 
time, the accused signed the consent form. 
During the search of her residence the police 
seized a ski mask and jacket. The accused’s male 
companion was interviewed and provided a 
statement to the police implicating the accused 
in the robbery.  
 
At her trial in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
the judge admitted the evidence seized by police 
from the accused’s residence. Although the 
judge concluded the accused had been detained 
at the shell station, he ruled that the police had 
articulable cause to detain her to further their 
investigation. However, the judge ruled that 
when the arrests were made the police lacked an 
objective basis for connecting the arrestees to 
the robbery—even though they believed they 
had sufficient grounds. Thus, there were no 
reasonable grounds for arrest under s.495 of 
the Criminal Code. The judge made no explicit 
finding of a Charter breach, but nonetheless 
admitted the evidence under s.24(2) of the 
Charter. She was convicted by a jury of robbery 
and wearing a disguise and sentenced to 18 
months in jail followed by a term of probation. 
However, she appealed to the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
seized items were not properly admitted.  
 
On the appeal the Crown conceded that the 
arrest of the accused violated her right not be 
arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the Charter. 
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Since the signed consent was obtained after this 
unconstitutional arrest, the accused suggested 
the consent was invalid and the items seized 
from this warrantless search were derivative 
evidence (conscriptive real evidence). Justice 
Fichaud, authoring the unanimous Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal decision, noted that an 
unconstitutional detention does not automatically 
render consent to search invalid. Rather, the 
consent to search will be invalid if the Crown 
fails to prove it was both informed and 
voluntary. However, assuming, without deciding, 
that the consent was involuntary and invalid, the 
evidence was nonetheless admissible under the 
s.24(2) criteria—trial fairness, serious of the 
violation, and administration of justice. 
 
Trial Fairness 
 
The evidence obtained from the accused’s 
apartment was not derivative evidence—an item 
of real evidence discovered when the accused is 
conscripted against themselves (usually in the 
form of a statement) as a result of a Charter 
violation. It was discoverable by another 
independent means—the police could have 
obtained a search warrant from the statement 
of her male companion implicating her in the 
robbery.  Even if this statement was made to 
police while her male companion was under 
unconstitutional arrest, it does not render the 
evidence derivative. Determining whether 
evidence is derivative evidence does not turn on 
whether the alternative method of discovery is 
constitutional. It is only when the evidence is 
found to be conscriptive that the alternative 
means of discovery requires compliance with the 
Charter. Justice Fichaud stated: 
 
Accordingly, in my view, it is irrelevant to the 
admissibility of the seized items whether [the 
accused’s companion] was under 
unconstitutional arrest when he gave his 
statement. His statement was the alternate 
route by which the police could have obtained 
a search warrant and seized the items. The 
seized items were not derivative conscriptive 
evidence against [the accused]. [para. 57] 
 
Since the evidence was not compelled self 
incrimination, the trial would not be rendered 
unfair. 
 
Seriousness of the Violation 
 
The Charter breach was not serious. The police 
acted in good faith, had sufficient grounds to 
detain, and believed they had sufficient grounds 
to arrest even though they lacked a sufficient 
objective basis. With respect to the detention 
of the accused, Justice Fichaud stated: 
 
I agree with the trial judge's conclusion that 
the police had "articulable cause" or, as 
rephrased in Mann "reasonable grounds", to 
detain. The police had tracked the robber 
from the store to the apartment building, and 
had seen a red or wine coloured Grand Prix or 
Grand AM speeding from the apartment 
building's parking lot. Shortly after, the RCMP 
saw a wine coloured Grand Prix containing [the 
accused] and [her companion] enter the Shell 
station nearby. The threshold for a detention 
is lower than for an arrest. Although the 
Crown has conceded that the arrest at 1:15 
a.m. violated the Charter, there is no 
concession for the earlier detention at the 
Shell station. In my view, the trial judge 
correctly ruled that the police had articulable 
cause or reasonable grounds to detain [the 
accused and her companion] at the Shell 
station, before their arrest. [para. 35] 
 
Had the initial detention been unconstitutional, 
the later unconstitutional arrest would have 
compounded the Charter breach rendering it 
more serious than an unconstitutional arrest 
alone. Furthermore, the police read the accused 
her Charter rights and twice provided the 
opportunity for her to talk to counsel. Unlike the 
determination of derivative evidence, the 
constitutionality of the alternative means of 
discovery becomes a consideration under this 
branch of the s.24(2) analysis. However, as the 
court noted, even if her companion’s arrest was 
unconstitutional—a fact not conceded to by 
Crown—the same factors mentioned regarding 
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the accused’s arrest would apply. Thus, the 
breach was not serious. 
 
Administration of Justice  
 
The trial judge did not err in holding that the 
exclusion of evidence, not its admission, would 
adversely affect the administration of justice.   
 
The appeal was allowed on other grounds, the 
accused’s conviction was quashed, and a new trial 
was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
BC POLICE GET NEW CODE OF 
ETHICS 
 
On January 14, 2005 the 
British Columbia Police Code 
of Ethics was unveiled at the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia during a formal 
signing ceremony. The Code 
was endorsed by the BC Association of Chiefs of 
Police, RCMP, BC Association of Municipal Chiefs 
of Police, Vancouver Police Officers Association, 
Vancouver Police Union and BC Federation of 
Police Officers.  
 
The British Columbia Police Code of Ethics 
 
The people of British Columbia expect the police 
to serve with courage, fairness, impartiality and 
integrity and to apply democratic principles that 
honour human dignity in the pursuit of justice. 
Recognizing that the policing profession is 
distinguished by the character and values of the 
individuals within it, the British Columbia Police 
Code of Ethics reflects the commitment of all 
Police Officers in British Columbia, regardless of 
their rank or position, to ethical principles and 
values, and acceptance of the responsibilities 
and privilege that accompany public service. 
Moreover, it is recognized that the Police Code 
of Ethics applies both individually and 
collectively, and as such applies equally to the 
organizations and agencies that make up the 
policing profession in British Columbia.  
 
Fundamental Principles 
 
Police Officers in the Province of British 
Columbia, along with their respective 
organizations and agencies, embrace the 
following Fundamental Principles, which underpin 
the Guiding Values, Primary Responsibilities and 
Decision-Making framework.  
 
• democracy & the rule of law 
• justice & equality 
• protection of life & property  
• safeguarding the public trust  
• that the police are the public and the 
public are the police  
• the principles of the Constitution of 
Canada  
• the rights enshrined in the Charter of 
Rights & Freedoms  
 
Guiding Values 
 
Police Officers in the Province of British 
Columbia, along with their respective 
organizations and agencies, look to the following 
Guiding Values, which should direct all our 
decisions. Moreover, we recognize that our 
decisions will be judged according to how well 
they correspond to these values. 
  
• citizenship  
• courage  
• fairness  
• impartiality  
• integrity  
• loyalty  
• public service  
• respect  
 
Primary Responsibilities  
 
Police Officers in the Province of British 
Columbia, along with their respective 
organizations and agencies, affirm the following 
Primary Responsibilities, which are defined in 
terms of three key relationships. First, there is 
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the Public, for whom we serve. Next there are 
Professional Partners, with whom we work, and 
ourselves Personally, to whom we must be true. 
Moreover, we recognize that responsibility 
occurs personally and collectively, and that 
accountability must accompany responsibility for 
it to be effectual.  
 
The Public 
 
Our basic policing duties are to protect lives and 
property, preserve peace and good order, 
prevent crime, detect and apprehend offenders 
and enforce the law, while at the same time 
protecting the rights and freedoms of all 
persons as guaranteed in our Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. In fulfilling these duties, we must 
strive for excellence, which includes the 
exercise of professional discretion and judgment 
in a manner consistent with our Fundamental 
Principles and Guiding Values. Recognizing, 
however, that the ability of the police to 
perform their duties is dependent upon public 
approval, support and willing cooperation, we 
must also provide open, responsive, impartial and 
accessible service. In other words, to safeguard 
the public trust, we will be responsible to the 
public and accountable publicly for what we do. 
 
The Policing Profession and Partners 
 
Consistent with our duties and responsibilities to 
the public, we are also responsible to the policing 
profession. First, we must always respect and to 
the best of our abilities abide by the standards 
of the profession, while at the same time seeking 
to improve them. To accomplish this, we will 
demonstrate a willingness to engage in open 
dialogue, which raises important issues and 
significant opportunities that can advance the 
profession for the purpose of providing better 
policing service to the public. This entails an 
openness to change and recognition of the need 
for the policing profession to develop informed, 
collaborative and participative police officers.  
 
In addition to the policing profession, we are 
responsible to other professions that also serve 
the public. We must always cooperate with other 
police and law enforcement professionals, and 
with all those in the criminal justice system, in 
order to develop an open, just, and impartial 
justice system. As well, we must always strive to 
cooperate with other public service professionals 
in order to advance the public good. This involves 
the sharing of information in a relationship-
building manner that celebrates the 
interdependent nature of professionals in 
promoting the goals of the justice system. This 
information sharing must balance confidentiality 
needs and due process with the needs of 
professionals, who are working for justice and 
the common good.  
 
Personally  
 
We accept personal responsibility for acting 
legally and ethically. The Police Officer is a 
model of discipline under trying circumstances, 
but to achieve this we must practice humility and 
a desire to learn from our experiences and 
mistakes and those of others. As individuals we 
must have a clear idea of how to separate 
private advantage from public service and to 
make decisions that avoid conflicts of interest 
and the appearance of personal gain. As well, 
ethical behaviour entails duties that we owe to 
ourselves personally. In addition to reflecting 
upon what is right and what is wrong in the 
context of policing, we must as individuals 
develop a proper balance between our work and 
our personal life  
 
Ethical Decision-Making  
 
Acting responsibly towards the Public, the 
Policing Profession and its Partners, and to 
ourselves Personally, will reduce the number and 
severity of ethical difficulties faced in policing, 
but it will not eliminate them. Ethical difficulties 
emerge when Police Officers, either as 
individuals or collectively, act in a way that is not 
defensible on legal and ethical grounds. To avoid 
such difficulties, Police Officers, along with 
their respective organizations and agencies, 
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should ask themselves the following questions, 
which help to identify ethical issues and to test 
decisions on ethical grounds.  
 
1. Is the activity or decision consistent with 
organizational or agency policy and the law?  
 
2. Is the activity or decision consistent with the 
British Columbia Police Code of Ethics?  
 
3. What are the outcomes or consequences 
resulting from the activity or decision and 
whom do they affect?  
 
4. Do the outcomes or consequences generate 
more harm than good? Do they create 
legitimate controversy?  
 
5. Is the activity or decision likely to raise 
actual or perceived conflicts of interest 
where a personal advantage is gained because 
of one's professional position?  
 
6. Can the activity or decision be justified 
legally and ethically? Would the activity or 
decision withstand public scrutiny on legal and 
ethical grounds if it resulted in problems that 
became known generally?  
 
If the answers indicate that there may be a 
question of professional ethics, then consultation 
should occur with someone trustworthy and 
experienced who can provide reasonable 
direction and advice. 
  
Policing is serious work and there are important 
issues at stake. It requires not only technical 
competence but also a willingness to take 
difficult action in trying times. As well, it 
requires a recognition that we must act with a 
concerted commitment to serve and protect 
using democratic principles in the service of the 
law while honouring human dignity in the pursuit 
of justice. And it is this commitment to 
principled policing that distinguishes us as 
professionals, both to ourselves and to the 
public. 
COURTS GET TOUGHER ON 
FLIGHT FROM POLICE 
R. v. Roberts, 2005 ABCA 11 
 
Following a citizen report of a 
car prowler in a residential 
neighbourhood, the police 
attempted to stop the 22 year 
old accused driving a stolen truck, but he fled 
and failed to stop for the emergency equipment. 
A pursuit ensued on slippery roads through 
major and residential areas, with speeds 
reaching 110 km/h. He ran through some 
intersections without stopping. Two officers in a 
patrol car were about to get out of the vehicle 
and lay a spike belt across the road at a 
residential intersection when the accused drove 
straight at them and rammed the police car head 
on, severely damaging it and seriously injuring 
the officers inside. He ran from the crash but 
was found hiding by a police dog in the yard of a 
residence. He fought with officers until the 
police dog subdued him.  The accused was also 
wanted on a warrant for failing to attend court 
on an earlier possession of stolen vehicle charge. 
 
The accused plead not guilty and was let out on 
bail. He failed to show for his preliminary 
hearing and was later arrested, but again let out 
on bail. He failed to show for his trial and was 
again arrested. He ultimately plead guilty to 
possession of stolen property over $5000 and 
police pursuit causing bodily harm and apologized 
some 17 months after the offence. Charges of 
dangerous driving and fleeing an accident scene 
were dropped. At his sentencing hearing he told 
the judge he ran from police because he had 
been using drugs and had amphetamines in the 
truck. He said he did not intend to ram the 
police car, but the crash occurred because of 
speed and road conditions. The judge believed 
him and also recognized his guilty plea as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing. He sentenced 
the accused to about 34 months on the flight 
charge, but nothing for the possession charge. 
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The Crown appealed the sentence to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal.  
 
First, the Alberta Court of Appeal addressed 
the non-sentenced possession offence. Noting 
that “possession of a stolen vehicle is a serious 
offence, especially when the driver recklessly 
demolishes the vehicle”, Justice Cote, authoring 
the unanimous judgment, concluded that a 
sentence for the possession offence concurrent 
to the flight offence, as the accused suggested, 
would not be appropriate. They require 
completely separate elements and intents, even 
though they involve the same truck and overlap 
in time. Justice Cote stated: 
 
Furthermore, flight causing bodily harm is a 
new separate crime. Why would anyone lead 
police on a chase if he had been doing nothing 
wrong when told to stop, and was not wanted 
by police? Why would he do it if he were 
driving his own vehicle with his own license 
plate? Flight then would be pointless. That 
rarely occurs. Usually drivers flee because 
they are either then committing another 
offence, or have clear evidence of another 
offence in their vehicle. Often the vehicle is 
stolen. 
 
To give concurrent sentences then would be to 
wipe out one of the offences, for all practical 
purposes. So long as the penalty given for 
flight were not larger, this would be a virtual 
judicial repeal of Parliament’s new criminal 
flight crime. That would violate Parliament’s 
strong message…. Alternatively, if the flight 
sentence were equal or higher, a concurrent 
sentence would wipe out the predicate offence 
which the criminal was fleeing, and so make the 
flight successful. It would reward flight, not 
punish it. It would take Jonathan Swift to 
appreciate the irony. [paras. 33-34] 
 
Second, the mitigating factor attributed to the 
guilty plea was militated by the accused’s two 
failure to appears where more than a dozen 
witnesses, including the two injured officers had 
been in attendance. Rather than promptly 
pleading guilty gratuitously, he belated his guilty 
plea until over 17 months after the offence in 
exchange for the dropping of several charges. 
Moreover, the police had caught the accused red 
handed and there were many professional 
witnesses making a conviction inevitable. The 
sentencing judge should not have given any 
significant credit for the guilty plea. 
 
Nor was the accused’s ongoing drug problem or 
his use of drugs at the time a mitigating factor. 
Rather, it should have been considered an 
aggravating factor. “Choosing to drive after 
knowingly consuming drugs or alcohol clearly 
aggravates any driving offence then committed,” 
said Justice Cote. Furthermore, the fact the 
accused fled the accident, hid, had to be 
tracked, fought with police, and took other steps 
to evade conviction also created aggravating 
circumstances. As well, the prevalence of vehicle 
flight from Edmonton police along with bodily 
injury climbing exponentially was also an 
aggravating factor overlooked by the sentencing 
judge.  
 
Finally, the reason provided by the accused for 
evading the police—to escape trouble from drug 
offences—was not a mitigating factor at all. 
“Those who flee the police and engage in a chase 
usually do so to hide something illegal,” said 
Justice Cote. “Possessing amphetamines is not a 
minor matter, like having an out-of-date address 
on one’s operator’s permit.” Similarly, the 
suggestion that the collision resulted more from 
negligence, rather than an intentional act, was 
not mitigation. Justice Cote wrote: 
 
Had the [accused] deliberately rammed the 
car containing the two constables, that would 
have been a different, deliberate crime, such 
as attempted murder, maiming, assault causing 
grievous bodily harm, or aggravated assault… 
 
The offence for which the [accused] was 
sentenced was causing bodily harm, by 
operating a motor vehicle in a manner 
dangerous to the public, while being pursued by 
a constable in a motor vehicle and failing to 
stop to evade the constable (Criminal Code 
s.249.1(3)). No intent to injure 
or cause a collision is necessary to complete 
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that offence. The mode of driving required by 
s.249.1(3) is that in s.249(1)(a), dangerous 
driving. It is trite law that no intent to injure 
is necessary under that section. [paras. 50-53, 
references omitted] 
 
In determining a proper sentence in this case, 
the only mitigating factors recognized by the 
Alberta Court of Appeal were the accused’s 
relatively young age, the possibility of 
rehabilitation, and his belated remorse. On the 
other hand, flight from police is an aggravated 
criminal offence. When someone is injured as a 
result, the maximum sentence is 14 years, 
significantly more serious than criminal 
negligence, dangerous driving or impaired driving 
resulting in bodily harm. The manner of driving in 
this case made a collision highly probable and the 
serious injuries resulting were far from fluke, 
bad luck nor unforeseeable. In passing s.249.1 of 
the Code, Parliament recognized that the 
offence is very dangerous to the public, the 
moral turpitude is greater than dangerous 
driving because of the deliberateness and 
contumacy required, and the penalties must be 
equal to or greater than penalties of the offence 
being fled. The accused’s conduct was dangerous 
and resulted from a conscious decision to flee 
for some distance. He was not seduced or bullied 
by others into the offence and continued to flee 
and show his disregard for others even after the 
crash.  
 
The accused’s sentence on the flight causing 
bodily harm was increased to three and a half 
years and an additional four months and 14 days 
consecutive for the possession offence was 
added, after the court recognized the “globality” 
principle that combined sentences should not be 
unduly long as well as crediting some time for 
pre-trial custody.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
People may fail many times, but they become 
failures only when they begin to blame someone 
else--Unknown 
PHYSICAL ACCESS, NOT 
VISUAL ACCESS, DEFINES 
PUBLIC PLACE 
R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2 
 
Neighbours in a nearby house 
looking across their backyard 
from their partially lit family 
room saw the accused standing in 
his illuminated living room masturbating. They 
moved to their darkened bedroom and continued 
to watch the accused for 10-15 minutes from a 
distance of 90 to 150 feet. At one point the 
neighbours used binoculars and a telescope to 
confirm what the accused was doing. The police 
were called and the accused was arrested and 
charged under s.173(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal 
Code. Under s.173(1)(a) it is an offence to 
willfully commit an indecent act in a public place 
in the presence of one or more persons. Public 
place is defined in s.150 of the Code as including 
“any place to which the public have access as of 
right or by invitation, express or implied.” 
Section 173(1)(b) makes it an offence to commit 
an indecent act in any place with the intent to 
insult or offend any person.  
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused was acquitted under s.173(1)(b) 
because the judge concluded he did not know he 
was being watched nor that he intended to 
“insult or offend any person” as required by the 
section. However, he was convicted of 
committing an indecent act in a public place 
under s.173(1)(a) since his living room had been 
converted into a public place—since he could be 
seen through his window—and willfully did it in 
the presence of one or more persons (the 
neighbours). The accused’s appeals to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court and the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal were unsuccessful.  
 
On further appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the accused’s conviction was vacated and 
an acquittal was entered. Justice Fish, authoring 
the unanimous Supreme Court judgment, 
 Volume 5 Issue 1             www.jibc.bc.ca 
January/February 2005 
35
concluded that the accused’s living room was not 
a public place for the purpose of s.173(1)(a). The 
type of access contemplated in the definition of 
public place requires physical access within, not 
visual access from without. Justice Fish stated: 
 
Section 150 of the Criminal Code uses the 
word "access" in reference to a "place" -- in 
this case, a private home. And our concern is 
with access to that place "as of right or by 
invitation". In common usage, "access" to a 
place to which one is invited or where one has 
a right to be refers to entering, visiting or 
using that place -- and not, as I said earlier, to 
looking or listening in from the outside. When 
we are told that someone has access, as of 
right or by invitation, to an apartment, a 
workshop, an office, or a garage, this does not 
signify to us a mere opportunity or ability to 
look through a window or doorway and to see 
what is happening inside. [para. 45] 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
COPS AS CROOKS NOT 
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY 
R. v. Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5 
 
The police commenced an 
undercover operation to obtain 
evidence from the accused, the 
principal suspect in the murder 
of his aunt. The officers, posing as members of a 
criminal organization, recruited the accused and 
gained his confidence and trust. They engaged 
him in various criminal activities, including money 
laundering, theft, receiving illegal firearms, and 
drug dealing, and encouraged him to talk about 
his role in the murder because, as they told him, 
they needed to ensure none of the organization’s 
members were under police investigation. He was 
also told the organization had the ability to 
divert suspicion of his involvement in the murder 
by using corrupt police officers who could 
influence the investigation. He believed they 
could influence the prosecution by having 
witnesses and physical evidence disappear and he 
ultimately confessed to his involvement in the 
murder, provided details and took them to the 
crime scene.  
 
At his trial, the judge concluded that the 
undercover officers were not persons in 
authority and therefore a voir dire to determine 
the admissibility of the statements was not 
necessary. His statements were admitted and 
the accused was convicted of first-degree 
murder. He appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal, but a majority dismissed his appeal. The 
accused further appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada arguing, among other grounds, that 
the undercover officers were persons in 
authority because he believed they could 
influence his aunt’s murder investigation. 
 
Person in authority-who did the accused 
believe he was talking to? 
 
The common law confessions rule requires the 
Crown prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
statement made to a person in authority is 
voluntary. If this burden is not met, the 
statement is excluded as evidence. The rationale 
for this rule is twofold; it encourages statement 
reliability and discourages improper police 
coercion. In determining whether a confession is 
admissible in court, the accused bears the initial 
burden of showing there is a valid issue for 
consideration that they believed the person 
receiving the statement was a person in 
authority. If the accused meets this threshold 
determination, the burden shifts to the Crown to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused did not reasonably believe the receiver 
was a person in authority or, if they did hold 
such a reasonable belief, that the statement was 
nonetheless voluntary.  
 
Generally, a person in authority is someone 
engaged in the arrest, detention, interrogation 
or prosecution of an accused, but could also 
include someone the accused perceives to be 
allied with, an agent of, or acting on behalf of or 
in concert with the police or prosecuting 
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authorities. Justice Abella, writing the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s opinion, dismissed the 
accused’s appeal. She stated: 
 
The test of who is a "person in authority" is 
largely subjective, focusing on the accused's 
perception of the person to whom he or she is 
making the statement. The operative question 
is whether the accused, based on his or her 
perception of the recipient's ability to 
influence the prosecution, believed either that 
refusing to make a statement to the person 
would result in prejudice, or that making one 
would result in favourable treatment. 
 
There is also an objective element, namely, the 
reasonableness of the accused's belief that he 
or she is speaking to a person in authority. It 
is not enough, however, that an accused 
reasonably believe that a person can influence 
the course of the investigation or 
prosecution…[paras. 38-39] 
 
In her view, the accused believed the undercover 
officers were crooks, not cops. Even though they 
said they had corrupt police officers they 
controlled and could potentially influence the 
murder investigation against him, the coercive 
power of the state—which the confessions rule 
is designed to address—was not engaged and the 
statements were therefore not made to a person 
in authority.  
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
RANDOM DOG SNIFF NOT A 
SEARCH 
R. v. Davis, 2005 BCPC 11 
 
The police randomly used a 
passive alert narcotic detector 
dog aboard a BC Ferry as part 
of a drug interdiction operation 
to sniff around vehicles on a 
parking deck that was open to public access. The 
dog indicated on a van after it put its nose up to 
the opening of a pop out window and sat down. 
The accused was sleeping in the front passenger 
seat with the window partially open. As officers 
approached the van they smelled a strong odour 
of fresh marihuana coming from it. They tapped 
on the window, identified themselves, and 
arrested the accused for possession of a 
controlled substance. The vehicle was secured, 
taken back to the police station and searched 
after a warrant was obtained. Behind the 
driver’s seat police found a container with 18 
ziplock bags of marihuana and the accused was 
charged with possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court to determine the admissibility of the 
evidence, the accused argued his rights under 
s.8 of the Charter securing him from 
unreasonable search and seizure had been 
violated. For the purposes of the constitution a 
search occurs when police conduct interferes 
with a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Although there was little doubt the 
accused had a privacy interest in his vehicle’s 
interior, Judge Auxier ruled he did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the air 
containing the odour of marihuana surrounding 
its exterior that was detected by the dog.  
 
Relying on the recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decision R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 in which the 
court concluded the use of a FLIR device on a 
home was not a search engaging constitutional 
protection, the judge found the information 
supplied by the dog’s actions did not reveal a 
biographical core of personal information nor 
reveal intimate details of lifestyle. Thus, the 
accused did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the area surrounding his vehicle when 
parked on a ferry deck open to public access and 
therefore the dog sniff was not a search under 
the Charter. On that basis, there was no breach 
and the evidence was admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourts.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Fall seven times. Stand up eight—Japanese 
Proverb 
